

# Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS MONTHLY

DECEMBER, 1973

## NON-CIRCULATING

### SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1973

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# Current History

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# Current History

DECEMBER, 1973

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*In this issue, seven articles examine the political and economic situation in Southeast Asia, now that United States policy is shifting. Our lead article points out that in "August, 1973, caretaker governments still survived in Saigon and Pnompenh, but otherwise Southeast Asia was Communist-dominated. This is what European realism had anticipated in 1954 and what American folly, at incalculable cost, only deferred."*

## The Vietnam War in Historical Perspective

BY RICHARD W. VAN ALSTYNE

*Distinguished Professor of History, Callison College, University of the Pacific*

TO PLACE THE WAR in Vietnam in some sort of historical perspective is difficult: it is so tragic. The war is by no means an event of the past, even though hostilities may have died down. Vietnam is in a state of disintegration, perhaps permanently so, and none of the basic issues associated with the original conflict have been settled. Moreover, the problem is not limited to Vietnam: it takes in the whole of Indochina, including Laos and Cambodia. Vietnam has been the main theater of war; but from time to time, the conflict has spilled over the borders.

Political boundaries do not relate to geography. Between Laos and Vietnam to the east the line runs irregularly through the mountains, at one point—the 17th parallel—getting close to the sea. A primitive and sparsely populated country, Laos "is shaped like a caveman's club, with a knobby head in the north, and a handle extending southward. The very butt of the handle is the border with Cambodia."<sup>1</sup> Laos is a corridor type of country, but the terrain is too difficult to make the corridor valuable. Most of the population is concentrated in the lowlands of the north, which are shared with the people of Thailand on the south bank of the Mekong River. Cambodia is practically all lowland and, except for the Mekong River coursing through before splitting into a large delta

below Saigon in South Vietnam, she would probably remain outside of the area of conflict. But the border region is a shatter zone where Communist guerrillas from South Vietnam can retreat and regroup, and so the invading Americans have not hesitated to cross over and bombard it repeatedly from the air. Just as all of Indochina was formerly under French domination, so the Vietnamese Communists (Vietcong) and the Americans fight to bring the whole region under their respective control.

In sharp contrast to the sad fate of Vietnam is the remarkable success of Yugoslavia in southeastern Europe. In the Yugoslav case, statesmanship of the highest order was conspicuous; in Vietnam, it has been wholly lacking. During World War II the Yugoslav Partisans, who were Communists, engaged their enemies, the German-supported party of Mihailovic, in bitter civil strife. Tito, the guerrilla head of the Partisans who rules Yugoslavia to this day, was a Moscow-trained Communist whom the Soviet government expected to dominate. In London, there was a Yugoslav government-in-exile headed by a young king whom British Prime Minister Winston Churchill hoped to see restored to his throne.

Nevertheless, in 1943, the British established relations with the Partisans and, meeting personally with Marshal Tito in August of the following year, Churchill concluded a working arrangement. The common ground between the two was their mutual desire

<sup>1</sup> Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation. The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 94.

for a united Yugoslav government capable of defeating the Germans and of remaining in power after the war. Whether British intelligence knew that all was not harmony between Tito and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, a fact that was revealed later, is uncertain, but Churchill decided to gamble on Tito. The British statesman had the good sense not to treat the leader of the Yugoslav liberation movement as a cat's-paw of Russia. Nor did he try to force the issue of the restoration of monarchy. Instead he underwrote Tito with arms and munitions, stipulating only that arms would be cut off if Tito used them against his internal rivals instead of against the main enemy, the Germans. On his part, Tito understood that this was the road to genuine Yugoslav independence, and he braved the wrath of Stalin accordingly.<sup>2</sup> The results speak for themselves.

Counterparts to Tito and the Yugoslav Partisans were Ho Chi Minh and the Vietminh, or national liberation league. Originally, the Vietminh was an underground revolutionary party employing terrorist tactics against the French in the Mekong delta during the 1920's, but the French stopped at nothing to break it up, so that after 1930 it had no leaders. Ho Chi Minh stepped into this vacuum in 1944-1945, showing exceptional qualities of leadership in bringing the factions together in a program of national independence. Ho was a confirmed Communist, a party member in France even prior to 1914, and an observer of revolutionary techniques picked up in Moscow and, later, from the Kuomintang in China.

Lacking the flamboyant characteristics of Tito and unimpressive in appearance ("slight, thin, with a skimpy mustache and stringy beard and the mark of tuberculosis on his face") he was nevertheless a heroic figure who might well have succeeded if the French and the Americans had shown understanding and restraint comparable to the British attitude toward the Yugoslav Partisans. The British scholar, D. G. E. Hall, who is the leading authority on Southeast Asia, greatly admires Ho: "Self-effacing as a leader, he was a strict disciplinarian. Where other leaders and their parties failed, his firm, intelligent leadership succeeded; and . . . his movement persisted against all attempts by the French to extirpate it."<sup>3</sup>

British Major-General Douglas Gracey, disembarking at Saigon in September, 1945, to take over from the Japanese had been told explicitly to stand aside from local politics. But he did just the opposite. The Vietminh were there expecting him to leave

them alone; instead, he "promptly kicked them out," as he boasted later, released the French who had been interned by the Japanese, and gave them weapons. Civil war thus began. Even so, the situation might have been saved if the French and American governments had accepted Ho Chi Minh at his face value. Ho had the friendship of a sympathetic high commissioner dispatched from Paris, and returned with him to the French capital seeking recognition of independence. He also appealed in writing to United States President Harry Truman and his Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to lend him a hand. But unfortunately, too many cross-currents were active both in Paris and in Vietnam, and Ho Chi Minh returned to his country empty-handed. French army and navy officers launched attacks on the Vietminh in his absence, and from then on fighting has never stopped.

### THE VIETMINH

At this point we must comprehend the peculiar nature of the Vietminh, a nationwide party which was led by a handful of Communists but was not Communist in its makeup. From Ho Chi Minh and his associates down through the peasant rank and file, the Vietminh commitment was to independence, which to the peasant meant primarily land reform. Like the Chinese Communists, the Vietminh turned the land over to the peasants, got recruits from them, and developed the type of guerrilla warfare that proved so successful in China. Justice William O. Douglas, who observed the Vietminh closely two years before their great victory over the French at Dienbienphu (May 7, 1954), described their tactics in his book *North from Malaya*. There was no regular Vietminh army, no massed action, no front line; there were only small units penetrating deep into the country, gathering recruits as they went, traveling at night, working as peasants in the rice paddies during the day, dissolving and then rendezvousing at an appointed time. Winning the peasants to their side was the first concern of the Vietminh; only then did they attack the enemy. Thus, while Douglas was still in the country, Vietminh guerrillas penetrated deep into the mountains of Laos, aiming to reach the Mekong and win over the Laotian peasants.

General Henri Navarre, the French commander, thought the moment of victory had arrived; by massing his army in a basin-shaped mountain valley close to the northern border of Laos, he would cut the enemy's supply line from China and keep him out of Laos. The war would be over in 1955. In his zeal Navarre was the prototype of the American General Douglas MacArthur, whose 1950 invasion of North Korea had almost caused a major war with China. Navarre turned the small village of Dienbienphu into a fortress, inviting his Vietminh enemy, General Vo Nguyen Giap, a master tactician who had learned

<sup>2</sup> Winston S. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), pp. 88-93.

<sup>3</sup> D. G. E. Hall, *A History of South-East Asia* (London: Macmillan, 1964), p. 720; William O. Douglas, *North from Malaya. Adventure on Five Fronts* (New York: Doubleday, 1953) p. 164. See also: *Atlas of South-East Asia*, with an introduction by D. G. E. Hall (London: Macmillan, 1964).



guerrilla warfare from the Chinese Communists, to engage him in battle. But the French general was far from his own base of supplies. Conscripting thousands of apparently willing peasants, Giap dragged artillery up the mountains surrounding Dienbienphu.

In Paris and Washington, serious consideration was given to Navarre's appeal for a powerful strike by bombers flying from the Philippines. Doubts arose as to whether an air raid would be decisive or whether only an invading army marching inland from the coast could accomplish the task. Pushed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and by some of the chiefs in the Defense Department, United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower was ready to go this far, provided Congress would consent. Leaders of that body, called hurriedly into consultation, expressed more doubts, however, and stipulated that the British government should share in the enterprise. The British had always kept out of Indochina, however, and again they refused. So Navarre had no choice but to surrender, and with his capitulation all French military action in Indochina came to an end.

For France, the stumbling block had been the issue of Vietnamese independence. That Ho Chi Minh and his two associates, Vo Nguyen Giap and Pham van Dong, were Communists (Chinese style) was a secondary consideration. Between Ho and the more liberal leaders in Paris, like Pierre Mendès-France, relations remained consistently friendly even after Dienbienphu. Pham van Dong, who now that Ho Chi Minh is deceased is President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), was Ho's capable representative in France both before and after Dienbienphu.

Jean Sainteny, who had made the original agreement with Ho in 1946, was in Hanoi. Sainteny shared with Ho a mutual desire for continuation of close cultural and economic ties between France and Vietnam. In 1955, he concluded another and very successful agreement with Hanoi leading to extensive trade and banking relations and to the retention of French cultural institutions in North Vietnam. In Hanoi to this day, the Ecole d'Extrême-Orient is a testimonial to the genuineness of this relationship.

A simple grant of independence with a free hand to the Vietminh to unify the three component parts of the country—Cochin China in the extreme south, Annam in the center, Tonkin in the north—was all that was necessary for the government in Paris to do, though it is by no means clear that the Vietminh could have accomplished unification even if left to itself. The Vietminh was a peasant's party in a country where 80 per cent of the population was peasant;

but it met with opposition in some of the cities, in Saigon particularly, and among the small but politically active minority of Catholics. Conservative elements in France, businessmen with investments in Cochin China, and the armed forces which actually held that part of the country would not yield on independence.

The utmost any French government would do was to establish a union of the three Associated States—Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia—each one possessing some local autonomy, but leaving the final authority in the government in Paris. With a blank check from Paris, the local French in South Vietnam by-passed Ho Chi Minh in 1948 and set up a new regime under a former ruler, Bao Dai, who agreed to return from exile. Bao Dai, too, was a Vietnamese nationalist, but he faced stiff opposition from certain vested groups in South Vietnam which, like the Chinese warlords of old, had their own private armies.

#### 1954 GENEVA CONFERENCE

While the battle for Dienbienphu was in progress, an international conference was being held in Geneva in an attempt to bring peace to Indochina. The Soviet Union had initiated the conference and France, war-weary and groping for a solution, welcomed it. China, the strength of North Vietnam, was there in support of the Vietminh; Britain was ready with a plan for neutralizing the country under international guarantee and was supported by India; and, finally, the United States, which had started pouring in supplies to the French, was a cool participant.

China and the United States were the major antagonists by this time, and in a sense the Vietnamese war was already a Sino-American war. The Americans had been aiding the French ever since the collapse of the Chinese Nationalists in 1949, and while this conference was in session they were carrying four-fifths of the French war costs. We remember that the Eisenhower government was also weighing the chances of direct intervention; and to this fact we must add that, discounting Bao Dai's capacity for leadership, it had picked out a perfervid nationalist and anti-Communist to take over the reigns of power in South Vietnam. None other than United States Supreme Court Justice William Douglas had "discovered" this man, whose name was Ngo Dinh Diem, studying "democracy" in a Catholic school in New Jersey. Less than a month after Dienbienphu the French, at American insistence, made Diem Prime Minister in Saigon, and the very next year after that, Bao Dai resigned to enjoy a pleasant life on the French Riviera, leaving Diem the absolute ruler of South Vietnam.<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile, in July, 1954, the powers at Geneva agreed to a series of accords bringing hostilities temporarily to an end. The natural dividing line between North and South Vietnam lay just north of the 16th

<sup>4</sup> B. S. N. Murti, *Vietnam Divided. The Unfinished Struggle* (Bombay; Asia Publishing House, 1964), pp. 125-62. This work by an Indian scholar gives many details not easily found elsewhere.

parallel at the *Col des Nuages*, five thousand meters high; and the ancient Dong Hoi wall, 100 kilometers long, marked the boundary. But, to save as many as possible of the Vietnamese Catholic population living in the coastal valley north of this boundary for South Vietnam, an artificial line was drawn along the 17th parallel.

Elaborate provisions were laid down for troop withdrawal and strict prohibitions of replacement were to be enforced by an international control commission. Cambodia and Laos solemnly promised not to ask for foreign military aid and, to encourage Vietnamese unification, general elections were to be held in July, 1956. Presumably, therefore, a simple majority vote would decide between the Vietminh and the non-Communist portion of the population. Said a member of the British delegation, which had advocated permanent partition at the natural boundary: "Why, you know, there wasn't anyone around that table [at Geneva] who would have bet a farthing that any of those countries could have stayed out of the Communist bloc for even three years. . . ."<sup>5</sup>

This was realism which the record substantiates. Vietnam was an international frontier which Geneva hoped to stabilize, but where the forces of war and revolution were too strong to be checked. Neither the Vietminh nor the United States was willing to compromise. The former now put more stress on a regular army under the flag of North Vietnam, but abundantly reinforced by recruits from the South. According to the British Foreign Secretary, North Vietnam would double in armed strength before the year was out.

We must now take note of the Vietcong—the national liberation front which organized the peasantry in South Vietnam, conducted guerrilla warfare and led in terrorist attacks on its enemies. The Vietcong was the revolutionary party which operated inside enemy territory but which was the inseparable ally and source of much manpower for the Democratic Republic. Its government claimed sovereignty over the whole of Vietnam but was restricted to that part north of the cease-fire line. With French evacuation completed, Hanoi became the capital; with France no longer an enemy, relations with Paris moved up to an almost cordial footing. The cultural tie held firm.

The political ambitions of Hanoi were not left in doubt, however: unification of all Vietnam and the ultimate triumph of the revolution in Laos and Cambodia. This was a genuine independence movement, a parallel to the experience of Yugoslavia. But whereas British diplomacy had skillfully fostered Yugoslav

independence and the United States had accepted the British lead, Americans refused to accept North Vietnam on similar terms. The United States was already five years into its holy war on communism. The infamous Senator Joseph McCarthy (R., Wis.) was leading the pack against "communism in government," but even liberals were swayed by the belief that the Moscow politburo had hatched a worldwide conspiracy. President Truman roundly declared (1949) that "we don't want any Communists around at any time"; and Dean Acheson, leading the way to intervention in Vietnam, insisted (1950) that the alternative was "the extension of communism" throughout Southeast Asia "and possibly westward." Acheson in effect espoused the domino theory, later popularized by President Eisenhower. It meant that Southeast Asia was selected as the battleground. The United States lacked factual support and misread Asian history; it erred in conceiving of Moscow or Peking as a directing head of a vast plot; and it would not confess to itself that in South Korea and Taiwan it already had its own client states straining for revenge on their immediate enemies. When, in 1954, the United States put Ngo Dinh Diem into South Vietnam, it set up a third puppet state, the most unruly of the three.<sup>6</sup>

### THE DIEM REGIME

Diem repudiated the Geneva accords, and the attitude of the United States was, to put the matter mildly, equivocal. On the one hand, it promised to respect the accords; on the other, it pumped supplies into South Vietnam and sent a military mission under the chief of staff, General Joseph Collins, to train the South Vietnamese army. The National Security Council in Washington pronounced Geneva a "disaster," and Secretary Dulles under the guise of a collective defense treaty added Cambodia and Laos to the American sphere of influence. Meanwhile, taking no chances on the possible success of the Geneva conference, the administration began smuggling arms into Saigon and secretly sent a team of experts under a Central Intelligence Agency agent to subvert the Vietminh. The team managed to gain entry into Hanoi and damage the public transportation system. In May, 1956, the United States openly flouted the Geneva ban on troop replacement by sending 350 military men to Saigon over and above the Americans already there.

Considering these moves, it seems hardly necessary to add that the elections provided for never took place. Conducted on a nation-wide scale without reference to the truce line, there could be little doubt of the results: North Vietnam had the larger population, and the Vietminh commanded the sympathies of the peasantry in South Vietnam. But South Vietnam was now, thanks to American maneuvering, an

<sup>5</sup> Hilsman, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

<sup>6</sup> See David P. Mozingo, "Containment in Asia Reconsidered," *World Politics*, XIX (April, 1967), pp. 361-77; Michael Leifer, "Vietnam and the Premises of Intervention: A Review Article," *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 45 (Summer, 1972), pp. 268-72.

"independent" sovereign state claiming title to all of Vietnam, so of course she could not see herself voted out of existence.<sup>7</sup>

Meanwhile General Collins, arriving in Saigon with instructions to back Diem to the limit, soon sized up the man with whom he had to deal. By nature, the Vietnamese was an inveterate dictator, consulting no one outside his immediate family circle. His brother, in particular, Ngo Dinh Nhu, was a pernicious influence. The pair were ardent Catholics, ruling a country which was overwhelmingly Buddhist, and fanatics among the latter, such as Tri Quang, seized the opportunity to stir up a popular uprising. Hué, just south of the truce line, was an ancient Buddhist center, and in 1963 it was here that the monks resorted to mass street demonstrations and even, in a few instances, to spectacular self-destruction by fire as a means of denouncing their oppressors. In Saigon alone, there were three other fanatical religious sects, each with its private army operating gangster-style and violently opposed to Diem.

The first attempt at assassination occurred in 1957. Meanwhile General Collins, after less than five months in the country, had urged that Diem be ousted, but Collins was checkmated by his opposite number, the C.I.A. agent, Colonel Lansdale, who was busy recruiting a palace guard for Diem. The kindest report on Diem comes from the pen of General Maxwell D. Taylor, who was with Collins in 1955 and who returned in 1961 as President John F. Kennedy's ambassador:

... a grave but pleasant face with the dreamy eyes of a mystic and the quiet dignity of a mandarin ... highly skilled in steering a conversation in the direction he wished it to go ... a man of stubborn courage and basic integrity ... [but] a difficult, suspicious introvert of the past.<sup>8</sup>

Taylor, a modest gentleman, writes of himself as "a true believer," deeply convinced of the soundness of American objectives. The National Security Council first wrote the official litany in 1956, and henceforth it became standard. Paraphrased, it reads as follows: assist Free Vietnam to develop a strong, stable and constitutional government; weaken the Communists so as to bring about the reunification of a free and independent Vietnam.<sup>9</sup>

Knowing that North Vietnam drew her war materials from China and the U.S.S.R., Taylor held it to be axiomatic that there was "a vast Communist alliance, directed by Moscow and Peking, for the purpose of bringing all Southeast Asia under its domina-

tion." Where he erred—and the error was fundamental—was his belief in the prevalence of a central conspiracy, his failure to realize that American intervention against North Vietnam left the Communist great power no choice but to support the North Vietnamese. It has long been common knowledge that Communist China has never been the tool of Russia; but it is not realized that the true cat's-paw in Southeast Asia is the Saigon regime, created by the United States in 1954 and kept in power ever since. Hanoi's record as an independent government is far more genuine than Saigon's; and for their part, Russia and China kept out of Southeast Asia, while the Americans with their eyes open waded right in.

### AMERICAN INTERVENTION

Thus pursuing their high sounding objective, the Americans tried out various schemes: (1) the strategic hamlet system, devised to concentrate the rural population in certain fortified villages which, when extended and linked together, would force the Vietcong to dissolve; (2) the introduction of Special Forces—guerrillas trained to penetrate enemy country and sabotage the communication system; (3) recruiting in Vietnam, notably among the Montagnards, a hill people who could be trained for guard duty in Saigon and at border stations; (4) bringing in American ground troops for the purpose of pushing the enemy out of South Vietnam; and (5) systematic bombing of North Vietnam, conducted from the Philippines or from aircraft carriers of the Seventh Fleet.

All five of these plans were conceived and partly put into practice by the Kennedy administration in 1962–1963. Needless to say, they required an ever increasing importation of supplies and weapons of all kinds. In addition to the Special Forces, there were 16,000 "advisers" in South Vietnam, their job being to train the South Vietnamese. Ground troops were brought in, partly to aid in repairing damage from floods in the Mekong delta, but with the intention of remaining for direct military action. The Defense Department in Washington decided that with an army of 8,000 men it could win the war by 1965. Intelligence reports showed how unlikely this would be; the Vietcong was a genuine resistance movement recruited from South Vietnamese peasants. Few of its members came from North Vietnam. It was an invisible army which ruled in the night by terrorist methods and melted away into the rice paddies during the day.

In its crudest form the American attitude was best expressed by Lyndon B. Johnson. To Johnson the choice lay between all-out offensive warfare in Vietnam or "pulling back our defenses to San Francisco." After visiting Saigon in May, 1961, the Vice President had private doubts about Ngo Dinh Diem, but

<sup>7</sup> *The Pentagon Papers* (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), which contain many disclosures, including those set forth in this article. See also: Ronald C. Nairn, "SEATO: A Critique," *Pacific Affairs*, XLI (Spring, 1968), pp. 5–18; Huynh Kim Khanh, "The War in Viet Nam: the U. S. Official Line," *ibid*, XLII (Spring, 1969), pp. 58–67.

<sup>8</sup> Maxwell D. Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares* (New York: Norton, 1972), pp. 229–30, 242, 259, 316.

<sup>9</sup> The full text is in *The Pentagon Papers*, p. 24.



in public he pronounced Diem to be the "Winston Churchill of Southeast Asia!"<sup>10</sup> Diem had formidable rivals, notably "Big Minh," the field commander of the South Vietnamese army, but Big Minh himself had a dangerous enemy in a younger officer, Nguyen Khanh. In spite of these factional quarrels, however, and in spite of Buddhist opposition and of the fact that the authority of the government hardly reached beyond the city limits of Saigon, the Americans persisted in thinking they could bring stability to South Vietnam. The American stalwarts in this program were Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Vice President, later President, Lyndon Johnson in Washington, and United States Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in Saigon.

By mid-summer, 1963, it was decided to throw American support behind Big Minh in a coup d'état against Diem and, through a C.I.A. agent, contact with Minh was established. As Lodge put it in a cable on August 29: "We are launched on a course from which there is no turning back: the overthrow of the Diem government. . . . U.S. prestige is already publicly committed . . . and will become more so as the facts leak out. . . ." This was, of course, an admission that the war was an American war, and that no Vietnamese could be allowed to stand in the way. The coup went through on schedule, November 1; Diem and his brother were captured and assassinated; three weeks later John F. Kennedy met with a similar fate. Johnson, Kennedy's successor, repeated the refrain about "assisting" the people of South Vietnam, but found nothing to please him in the military junta in Saigon. Big Minh was put out by his rival, Nguyen Khanh; but "the people" in South Vietnam were, in the sense of being effective, the Vietcong.

At this point, January, 1964, the Johnson government was given an opportunity to stop the war and return to something like the Geneva accords of 1954, which the Eisenhower government had promised to respect, and subsequently disregarded. President Charles de Gaulle of France performed the statesman-like act of establishing relations with China and then proposing that negotiations be initiated toward neutralizing Southeast Asia. Moreover, the Soviet Union warned that it would match American interference in Vietnam with more aid to the Vietcong. But the ruling clique in Washington continued on its headlong course. For the benefit of the public, Henry Cabot Lodge wrote an elaborate defense of the domino the-

ory, and Johnson reaffirmed the necessity of "knocking down the idea of neutralization wherever it rears its ugly head." This being the position, the Johnson government, not daring to disclose its real intentions, resorted more and more to methods of equivocation and concealment that dated back to 1954.<sup>11</sup>

Still pretending confidence in an "independent" South Vietnam while discounting her chances for survival, the administration prepared for a direct attack on North Vietnam. Interestingly enough, the President queried the C.I.A. on its view of the domino theory and got a reply in refutation: the only dominos would be South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. But United States prestige would be "profoundly damaged," while China would emerge as the leader of East Asia. As events developed and warfare became more savage, the administration was forced to abandon its pretense and admit that it was engaged in a naked struggle for power. Acting on a theory propounded by Walt W. Rostow, it started with a series of clandestine air attacks on North Vietnam. Rostow also, in February, 1964, initiated a proposal for the drafting of a congressional resolution to be so worded as to allow the administration to make war openly. William Bundy of the State Department drafted the resolution on May 25, but it was withheld pending a publicity campaign to justify the war.

### THE TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION

On July 30 a midnight raid was staged on two small North Vietnamese islands in the Gulf of Tonkin, and on August 2-3, the North Vietnamese responded with retaliatory attacks on two American destroyers cruising 23 miles offshore. Saying nothing about the previous American raids or about the covert warfare that had been going on since February, President Johnson convinced Congress that the attacks had been

(Continued on page 273)

<sup>10</sup> Hilsman, *op. cit.*, p. 420.

<sup>11</sup> *The Pentagon Papers*, pp. 197, 285; Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 308-12; Council on Foreign Relations, *The United States in World Affairs 1964* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 137-46. The annual volumes in this series contain much useful information, but need to be supplemented by *The Pentagon Papers* and other references cited herein.

Richard W. Van Alstyne's most recent book, *The United States and East Asia* (London and New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), should be read as background for the present article. Also germane to the subject is his *The Rising American Empire* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1960), reissued in paperback (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965) now in its sixth printing. In addition he is the author of the following books: *American Diplomacy in Action* (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, reissued, 1968), *Empire and Independence: The International History of the American Revolution* (New York: John W. Wiley, 1965), *Genesis of American Nationalism* (Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell-Ginn, 1970). He gave the Commonwealth Fund Lectures in American History at the University of London in 1965, and was Senior Fulbright Fellow at the same institution in 1960-1961.



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*"Thieu's violation of the Paris Agreement's central provision, therefore, will not by itself cause a shift away from support for the agreement. But if and when the liabilities of strict respect for the agreement appear to Hanoi and the PRG to outweigh the advantages, an attempt to complete the 1972 offensive may be forthcoming."*

## Vietnam: Politics of the Paris Agreement

BY D. GARETH PORTER

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ALTHOUGH MANY of its key provisions have not been carried out or have been only partially implemented, the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam,\* signed by the United States, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), the Republic of Vietnam (Saigon) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG)<sup>1</sup> on January 27, 1973, nevertheless established a new political and military context for that long and still unfinished conflict.

The terms of the agreement represented a compromise between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), in which both sides made substantial concessions in order to obtain an early settlement of the war. But they were by no means equally satisfactory to each of the two belligerents. For they tended to reverse certain political and military factors which had been advantageous to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) during the war. The most important change brought about by the agreement was the withdrawal of American military personnel and the pledge not to intervene in the conflict in the future—a formal renunciation which reflected the political reality of the virtual collapse of American support at home for participation in the war. Despite the massive introduction of United States military equipment into South Vietnam in November and December, 1972, which boosted Saigon's air force to some 1,300 fixed-wing aircraft and 800 helicopters,<sup>2</sup> the departure of the United States Air Force repre-

sented in itself a major shift in the military balance.

The agreement also froze a military balance in South Vietnam which was no longer as clearly favorable to the RVN as it had been a year earlier. The Communists in their 1972 offensive had seized large parts of several provinces, including most of Quang Tri, and had dramatically increased the strength of Communist forces south of the demilitarized zone. RVN President Nguyen Van Thieu's fear that the agreement would allow North Vietnamese troops in the South to remain was realized; the text failed to mention even obliquely the withdrawal of any North Vietnamese troops from the South, reflecting the DRV's firm refusal to put its troops on the same legal basis as the Americans in South Vietnam.

The importance of this issue to Thieu was underscored by the repeated public demands by the RVN in December and January, long after the original draft agreement was made public, for the withdrawal of all North Vietnamese troops from the South as a condition for signing the agreement. Thieu's press spokesman and political adviser, Hoang Duc Nha, admitted that the sanctioning of the presence of North Vietnamese troops in the South in the agreement "means that our 15-year fight has been senseless."<sup>3</sup>

The central military and political obligations which the agreement imposed on the parties under the agreement were no less unfavorable to Thieu. An in-place cease-fire, the demarcation of zones of control, the restoration of democratic freedoms and freedom of movement, the establishment of the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord and the release of captured and detained civilians would have a series of important effects which Thieu found unacceptable: the recognition of the existence of two administrations with equal legal authority to determine the political future of South Vietnam; the consolida-

\* The text of the agreement appears in *Current History*, March, 1973, pp. 127ff.

<sup>1</sup> After the start of the 1972 general offensive, the Provisional Revolutionary Government quietly changed its name to "Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam," PRG; the Vietcong was the fighting arm of the PRG.

<sup>2</sup> *Boston Globe*, January 17, 1973.

<sup>3</sup> *Boston Globe*, October 30, 1972.

tion of the PRG zone and the reversal of the exodus of population from those areas which had taken place during the war; the erosion of Thieu's political monopoly in the RVN zone; the acceleration of local accommodations which would slow down RVN repression of civilian support of the National Liberation Front; and the shift of the conflict to the political plane, at which the Communists were more skilled and confident than the RVN.

Because the military and political provisions were so clearly adapted to the revolutionary strategy of the DRV and the PRG, there was a dissymmetry of interests on the part of the contending South Vietnamese parties in the implementation of the agreement, which was reflected even in the attitudes of the two sides toward the distribution of the text. Hanoi and the PRG broadcast the text continuously over their radio and distributed it widely in printed form. But Thieu made no effort to acquaint the public or his own middle- and lower-ranking officials with the text, and actually communicated a distorted version of key provisions to his officials, so that most of them were convinced that the "in-place cease-fire" meant that the people had to remain where they were and could not return to homes in areas outside RVN control.

### THE STAND-STILL CEASE-FIRE

Although the DRV and PRG have an obvious interest in the implementation of the political provisions of the agreement, it is the stand-still cease-fire which is central to their strategy in the present phase. Internal Communist documents captured or reconstructed from interrogation reports in late 1972 indi-

cated an intention to observe the cease-fire strictly. One such document, captured by ARVN\* in October, 1972, showed that the Communists planned a nationwide "general uprising" in the 48 hours between the signing of the agreement and the time it was to go into effect, but that after the cease-fire date, they would rely on political struggle except for defense against expected ARVN attacks.<sup>4</sup> A major directive issued by the Central Committee of the Lao Dong party in Hanoi to its followers in the South and reconstructed by United States intelligence in November, 1972, ruled out any offensive operations during the first 60 days of the cease-fire and cautioned against any reprisals against Saigon government officials, thus substantiating the PRG's public pledge at that time that it would not carry out reprisals after a cease-fire.<sup>5</sup>

Reports from the field during the first weeks of the cease-fire confirmed that the policy outlined in these documents was in fact being carried out. In every case in which correspondents witnessed post-cease-fire fighting or were able to interview the inhabitants of the hamlets, the story was the same: Liberation Army soldiers entered the village well before the cease-fire came, and the ARVN counterattack came after the cease-fire.<sup>6</sup> Field reports did not support Saigon's daily charges of hundreds of PRG truce violations.

Where isolated ARVN units located in areas which the PRG considered to be its territory continued to move out of their bases on military operations, Communist forces were apparently authorized to attack the base as well as the unit in the field. ARVN rangers at Ton Le Chan, north of Saigon, were reportedly patrolling as far as two miles from their base into the surrounding PRG zone when they came under attack in late March.<sup>7</sup> The conflict at Ton Le Chan pointed up the importance of Article 4 of the agreement's protocol on the cease-fire, which called for commanders of local units in military contact with each other to meet and discuss ways of ending the fighting and preventing renewed hostilities. The PRG demanded that the commander of the ARVN Ranger base meet with the Liberation Army commander in order to avoid future fighting, but the Saigon government refused to allow the meeting.<sup>8</sup>

### LOCAL CEASE-FIRES

The PRG also pressed for specific reference to Article 4 when the four-party Joint Military Commission met in February to draft a new appeal for an end to the fighting, but the suggestion was vetoed by the RVN delegate.<sup>9</sup> This PRG position reflected the belief that many lower-level ARVN officers would be happy to arrange stable cease-fires with their local Communist counterparts if they were free to do so. In fact, the PRG has reported that many such meetings have taken place in spite of Saigon government objections, and that unit commanders have reached

\* Army of the Republic of Vietnam, i.e., the South Vietnamese army.

<sup>4</sup> Xerox copy of the document, entitled "Plan of General Uprising When a Political Solution is Reached," translated by USIS. The document's contents were reported in the *Washington Post*, November 6, 1972. Henry Kissinger was apparently referring to this plan when he charged in his December 17, 1972, press conference that the North Vietnamese were planning an offensive which would continue for "several weeks" after the cease-fire was to take effect (*The New York Times*, December 18, 1972). The document makes it clear, however, that no such military offensive was contemplated after the cease-fire date.

<sup>5</sup> New York Times News Service, *Washington Star-News*, November 23, 1972. The PRG pledge, in a Liberation Radio broadcast, was reported in a UPI dispatch from Saigon, October 29, 1972. Similar orders were reported by United States officials to have been in effect at the time of the signing of the agreement in January (*The New York Times*, January 23, 1973).

<sup>6</sup> See D. Gareth Porter, "Implementing the Paris Agreement," in *Foreign Military Sales and Assistance Act, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, 1973*, p. 449; and Dave McFadden, "Ceasefire: The War Continues," *American Report*, April 10, 1973, p. 5.

<sup>7</sup> *Christian Science Monitor*, April 7, 1973; also see the statement by Major General Hoang Anh Tuan, delegate of the PRG to the two-party Joint Military Commission, Liberation Press Agency, Hanoi Radio, April 2, 1973.

<sup>8</sup> *Washington Post*, April 7, 1973.

<sup>9</sup> Associated Press Dispatch, *Saigon Post*, March 17, 1973.

their own cease-fire agreements with the Liberation Forces in defiance of higher orders.<sup>10</sup>

The PRG's desire to bring about a stable cease-fire through local accommodations is related to its interest in moving from military conflict to political struggle in contested and RVN-controlled areas. Instructions from Communist cadres, reported by villagers in the Saigon area, suggested that the PRG viewed the absence of fighting as a new opportunity for winning over ARVN personnel as well as former Liberation Army soldiers who had rallied to the Saigon government, and for organizing demonstrations of popular grievances against the Thieu regime. In addition to campaigns to stimulate desertions from ARVN, villagers were told to plan demonstrations by widows and families of dead soldiers to demand pensions and houses from the RVN; other families were urged to demand the demobilization of their sons and husbands.<sup>11</sup> To be most effective, the political struggle campaign required an atmosphere of local reconciliation between the two sides and a widespread belief that the shooting war was over. Thus these political struggle plans were combined with orders to local Communist units to avoid contact with ARVN troops and to fight only if attacked.

The most important advantage of a stand-still cease-fire to the Communist PRG, however, was the chance to consolidate its own zone of control. The human and economic base of the PRG zone had been seriously weakened by years of devastation by United States and ARVN bombing and artillery, which had reduced its population drastically by forcing most of the peasants to flee to safe areas. After the cease-fire, therefore, the first orders of business for the PRG were the tasks of population resettlement and economic rehabilitation, which meant putting land back into cultivation and repairing and rebuilding irrigation

works which had been destroyed and damaged by bombing. In the five northern provinces, where the PRG was estimated to control about two-thirds of the land area, entire villages were quickly repopulated and rebuilt, reportedly with the help of prefabricated housing materials from the North.<sup>12</sup> Many of the returning refugees were those who had been forced to flee from the heavy American bombing of Quang Tri in 1972, either to mountainous areas to the west or to the southernmost provinces of North Vietnam.

Similar repopulation and rehabilitation efforts were undertaken in the southern provinces. In Tay Ninh, for example, a dozen new PRG villages were reportedly constructed in the first months after the agreement.<sup>13</sup> In the key PRG districts of Kien Phong Province in the Mekong Delta, the PRG claims that 5,000 hectares of previously fallow land is back in cultivation since the cease-fire. It also reports some 40,000 people left Saigon-controlled areas in the first three months after the cease-fire to return to their native villages in the PRG zone of western Cochinchina.<sup>14</sup> But the returning population, still a relative trickle rather than a flood, falls far short of the former population of the strongest base areas.<sup>15</sup> Continued fears of shelling and possible renewed bombing, as well as the Saigon government's efforts to interdict such movements, may have contributed to the hesitation of the former inhabitants of the PRG zone.

The PRG has been more successful in its effort to upgrade dramatically the transportation and communications system within its zone. With the help of bulldozers and in the absence of air attacks, it has undertaken a major new network of all-weather roads which begins at the demilitarized zone and continues through the Communist-held areas of Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Kontum provinces, and may reach all the way into Binh Dinh province some 150 miles away from the DMZ when it is finished.<sup>16</sup> It would be the PRG's equivalent of Highway One, the only all-weather road linking the RVN-controlled areas of those provinces.

There are apparently also plans for developing civil aviation within the PRG zone as well as between it and the DRV. In Quang Tri, Kontum, Binh Long and Tay Ninh provinces, a dozen airfields have been constructed, repaired or extended—a move which has obvious military implications in addition to administrative and economic benefits for the PRG.<sup>17</sup> A system of anti-aircraft guns, including surface-to-air missiles, first introduced in large numbers into the south during the 1972 offensive, has also been constructed at key points within the zone, with the intention of making the main PRG base area safe from air attack.<sup>18</sup> (Liberation Radio, however, reported a bombing raid against its airfield at Dak To in Kontum province as late as July 2.)

Although the PRG population base remains

<sup>10</sup> Liberation Radio, June 27, 1973. Brigadier-General Tran Van Cam, commander of the 23rd ARVN division at Kontum, admitted to columnists Evans and Novak that such local accommodations were "chronic" and expressed "deep concern" about them. *Washington Post*, May 18, 1973.

<sup>11</sup> Los Angeles Times Service, *Washington Post*, November 22, 1972.

<sup>12</sup> Arnold Isaacs, "Waiting for North Vietnam to finish its 1972 Offensive," *Baltimore Sun*, May 20, 1972, p. K2.

<sup>13</sup> *Baltimore Sun*, May 16, 1972.

<sup>14</sup> "South Vietnam in Struggle," June 18, 1973.

<sup>15</sup> About 75 per cent of the 641,000 people in Saigon's refugee camps at the time of the cease-fire agreement came originally from Quang Tri, Binh Dinh, Kontum and Binh Long, four provinces largely controlled by the PRG. *Washington Post*, January 25, 1973.

<sup>16</sup> *The New York Times*, May 7, 1973; *Baltimore Sun*, May 22, 1973.

<sup>17</sup> The airfields are detailed in a note by the RVN Embassy in Paris to the DRV. See Embassy of Vietnam, Washington, D.C., Press Release No. 15/73, September 10, 1973.

<sup>18</sup> Isaacs, *Baltimore Sun*, May 20, 1973. During the first six weeks of the 1972 offensive, Communist troops fired more than 800 SAM's at U.S. and Saigon planes. *U.S. News and World Report*, May 22, 1972, p. 18.

shrunk and its economy still must cope with the craters, dud bombs and toxification of the soil which is the legacy of the seven-year war of destruction waged against it, the Communists have clearly decided that a cease-fire represents the only possibility for rebuilding and "normalization." The steps taken to unify the base area of the PRG, to make its system of civilian and military supply more effective, and to put land back into cultivation represent only first steps toward restoring the strength which the National Liberation Front had before the American military intervention. That restoration depends in large part on whether the refugees from the zone believe that the war is really over and that they can cultivate their land in peace, and the policy of the DRV and PRG has therefore been preoccupied with creating just such a belief.

### RVN POLITICS

In contrast to the DRV and PRG leaders, President Thieu was extremely uncomfortable with an agreement which called for an end to the use of force as the main arbiter of the conflict. His fear of the "subversive" capabilities of the other side and of the slackening of anti-Communist zeal on his own side have put him in direct confrontation with the spirit as well as the letter of an agreement whose major themes were coexistence and reconciliation.

The long-awaited emergence of Thieu's "semi-official" *Dan Chu* party, touted as an instrument of "political struggle" during the cease-fire period and boasting an official membership of hundreds of thousands, has not made him any more confident of the ability of the RVN to compete with the Communists under peaceful conditions. Perhaps he recognizes that the structure of the party, based on obligatory membership by government officials plus quotas for party recruitment in each province, is of no value as a political instrument except in a carefully controlled election such as the 1971 presidential election.<sup>19</sup> He still feels that the RVN must physically eliminate the entire Communist political structure before it can open up its political processes. In a speech in August, 1973, Thieu declared, in one of his moments of candor: "as long as the Communist cadres remain in our

villages, hamlets and towns, we cannot say that we are strong politically."<sup>20</sup>

Predictably, Thieu openly defied the Paris Agreement on both the political and the military plane. While RVN spokesmen disclaimed any violation of the cease-fire on their parts, Thieu ordered his troops to reconquer any hamlet or territory lost to the PRG before the cease-fire deadline, claiming the right to keep fighting for areas which had been "historically" under his control.<sup>21</sup> His attitude toward the political provisions was summed up in his remark just before the signing: "I tell you that I believe this is solely a cease-fire agreement, no more, no less."<sup>22</sup>

One of the articles of the agreement which represented the most serious threat to Thieu was Article 11, which prohibits both reprisals against those who had collaborated with either side during the war and restrictions on basic democratic freedoms. These provisions obligated Thieu to abandon his campaign to "exterminate" all civilian personnel of the National Liberation Front; he was also obligated to allow "neutralist" groups to organize, meet and express their views publicly in the RVN zone. The result of the latter development would be a very rapid change in the political climate in Saigon and other cities which would erode the power of the Thieu regime. Thieu has openly refused to implement these provisions, declaring that the Communists would "take advantage" of such freedoms to "subvert our society from within."<sup>23</sup> Despite the fact that the text of the agreement specifies that Article 11 is to be implemented "immediately," the RVN has demanded the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops as well as the completion of an election law (including a date of Saigon's choosing), as a precondition for granting democratic freedoms.<sup>24</sup>

Thieu has also expressed concern with the PRG effort to strengthen its economic, administrative and military resources, using the Paris Agreement as its basis. In an interview published in his own party's newspaper in July, 1973, Thieu said: "We have to do our best so that the NLF cannot build itself into a state, a second state within the South." Just as the PRG has given top priority to encouraging people to return to their homes in the PRG zone, so the RVN has put heavy emphasis on measures to prevent any movement outside its zone of control. This is in violation of the freedom of civilian movement provided for in two places in the agreement (Article 11 and Article 3(b) of the cease-fire Protocol).<sup>25</sup>

The easiest means of discouraging the flow of refugees back to their old homes is to hit the area with artillery fire. Significantly, most artillery fire by ARVN since the cease-fire has been "harassment and interdiction fire," which is directed not against specific military targets but at general areas. Such action is not defensive, therefore, but a means of mak-

<sup>19</sup> On the Democracy party, see John Burgess, "Thieu's New 'Democracy,'" *American Report*, May 7, 1973, p. 5; *The New York Times*, November 18, 1972.

<sup>20</sup> Saigon Radio, Domestic Service, August 5, 1973.

<sup>21</sup> On Thieu's cease-fire policy, see Porter, *op. cit.*, and McFadden, *op. cit.*

<sup>22</sup> *Boston Globe*, January 25, 1973.

<sup>23</sup> "Hanoi's Current Strategy for South Vietnam through President Nguyen Van Thieu's Eyes," *Vietnam Report* (Saigon), July 15, 1973, p. 7.

<sup>24</sup> "Preliminary Draft Agreement Proposed by the RVN Delegation at the La Celle Saint Cloud Conference" (original Vietnamese text in *Que Huong*, published by the RVN Consulate in Paris).

<sup>25</sup> For an account of RVN policy toward refugees, see *Washington Post*, January 25, 1973.



ing life more difficult in the PRG zone and hampering the return of population to PRG areas. "Harassment and interdiction" fire continued at such a high level during the first months after the cease-fire that the United States finally reduced the supply of artillery shells to ARVN by one-third.<sup>26</sup>

Saigon's pressure on the PRG zone has also taken the form of ground operations into PRG-controlled areas, which ARVN now calls "security missions," but which the PRG calls "nibbling operations." ARVN forces have also been reported by non-Communist sources to have pushed into PRG-controlled areas to construct new permanent military posts which then inevitably become targets of Liberation Army attacks.<sup>27</sup> And there have been some major operations by ARVN aimed at seizing large chunks of PRG territory. One such operation was launched in northern Binh Dinh province, where the RVN had been limited to a narrow strip of land along Highway One before the offensive. Although ARVN spokesmen in Saigon attributed the heavy fighting in the area to North Vietnamese attacks, officers in the field freely admitted that they had unilaterally launched the offensive to occupy many square miles of territory on both sides of the highway, which had been held by the PRG since the 1972 offensive.<sup>28</sup>

One of Thieu's most important assets in maintaining the wartime demographic status quo has been the uncertainty of most Vietnamese refugees, after so many years of war, that peace really has returned for good. One of the RVN's political tactics after the cease-fire, therefore, was to feed the fear of a new round of war and American bombing by charging frequently that the North Vietnamese were planning a new offensive and reminding the Vietnamese that the United States was pledged to come to the RVN's aid in such an event.

This appears to have been the primary purpose of ARVN claims of a major North Vietnamese buildup of tanks and troops in South Vietnam after the cease-fire.<sup>29</sup> Although reports that "hundreds of tanks" and "tens of thousands of troops" infiltrated from the

North after the cease-fire agreement were repeated and amplified by United States officials, it appears that there was much less to them than first met the eye. The tank traffic, according to United States officials, actually ended by mid-March, with only a few having been sighted entering the South after the agreement.<sup>30</sup> And while North Vietnamese troops and supplies did undoubtedly continue to enter the South as the fighting continued at a high level following the cease-fire deadline, United States officials could not assert that there were any more North Vietnamese troops in the South by mid-March than there had been when the agreement was signed.<sup>31</sup>

Thieu has also used diplomatic means to combat the consolidation of the PRG. In a diplomatic note on September 10, 1973, protesting the building of 12 airfields in the PRG zone, the RVN asserted that the PRG could not receive civilian aircraft in its zone without the prior consent of the RVN. The note threatened military action against any aircraft which might try to enter the PRG zone from North Vietnam and demanded the dismantling of all airfields which had been built or repaired.<sup>32</sup>

Saigon was merely reasserting its claim to sovereignty over all of South Vietnam, including the PRG zone—a claim which Hanoi and the PRG had always rejected. More significant, however, was the fact that the United States Department of State, in a move obviously coordinated with Saigon, sent a note to the DRV on the same day, supporting the RVN protest and arguing that the introduction of aircraft into any part of South Vietnam without the RVN's consent was "not authorized by the Agreement of January 27 or permitted under international law." It concluded by emphasizing the "grave risks which the DRV would run by violating the airspace sovereignty of the Republic of Viet-Nam."<sup>33</sup>

United States support for Saigon's claim of sovereignty over PRG territory, denying the recognition of two co-equal administrations which underlies the agreement, represented an attempt to rewrite the Paris Agreement. One of the central issues of the final phase of the talks was the United States demand for language in the agreement recognizing Saigon's sovereignty over all South Vietnamese territory.<sup>34</sup> But Hanoi stood firm on the principle of "two administrations" in South Vietnam and prevailed. The final

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<sup>26</sup> *Washington Post*, June 3, 1973.

<sup>27</sup> *Christian Science Monitor*, March 20, 1973.

<sup>28</sup> *Washington Post*, September 30, 1972.

<sup>29</sup> President Thieu first made such charges on February 22, when he claimed that the Communists had infiltrated 20,000 troops and 200 tanks since the January 28 cease-fire date (*Manchester Guardian*, February 23, 1973). The numbers grew larger in subsequent weeks. As one Washington dispatch noted, however, American analysts had long considered Saigon government intelligence appraisals of the North Vietnamese army "grossly inflated." See Associated Press Dispatch, *Denver Post*, April 11, 1973.

<sup>30</sup> *Washington Post*, March 13, 1973; *The New York Times*, March 20, 1973.

<sup>31</sup> *Washington Post*, March 22, 1973.

<sup>32</sup> Embassy of Viet-Nam, Washington, D.C., Press Release No. 15/73, September 10, 1973.

<sup>33</sup> Department of State Press Release, No. 325, September 11, 1973.

<sup>34</sup> *The New York Times*, December 17, 1972; *Christian Science Monitor*, December 19, 1972.

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*"... American policy alone is the largest single factor in the continuation of the Cambodian war and the destruction of Cambodia's human and natural resources. Rather than providing a model of successful foreign policy, Cambodia is a human and national sacrifice to a presidential prescription for prolonged Indochina adventures."*

## Cambodia: Model of the Nixon Doctrine

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*"Cambodia is the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form."*

Richard Nixon, December 12, 1971.

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE to write about political events in Cambodia from the point of view of what Cambodians themselves might be hoping for or trying to do. Much of what is happening in their country is not, strictly speaking, Cambodian politics, but the result or repercussion of American interventions in Cambodian affairs. For this reason it is inappropriate to ask what is happening in Cambodia or how the war there is developing. In 1973, the appropriate questions became: what is being done to Cambodia, by whom, for what reasons and with what consequences for the future of that state? These questions cannot be addressed without considering Cambodia's developmental situation prior to the war as well as the implications of the Nixon Doctrine for which Cambodia was declared the model. The conclusion of this examination is that American policy alone is the largest single factor in the continuation of the Cambodian war and the destruction of Cambodia's human and natural resources. Rather than providing a model of successful foreign policy, Cambodia is a human and national sacrifice to a presidential prescription for prolonged Indochina adventures.

The Cambodian war began in 1970 when Lieutenant General Lon Nol's army backed a parliamentary-Cabinet coup against Cambodia's Chief of State and former King, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Official propaganda at the time charged Prince Sihanouk with treason for permitting Vietnamese revolutionaries to use Cambodian territory for rear base areas, supply

routes and for transit. The real motive was later revealed as simple economic and political expediency.<sup>1</sup> Cambodia was bankrupt after teetering precariously on the edge of collapse for four years. Bureaucratic, parliamentary and economic elites were deeply frustrated by Sihanouk's personal domination of public life. In addition, they were fearful that he neither would nor could guarantee their economic and political survival, which was threatened by rising inflation, by increasing rural insurgency, and by generalized administrative disorder, corruption and poverty. In a phrase, the coup was the logical consequence of accumulated grievances and unresolved developmental dilemmas generated over the course of Cambodia's political and economic evolution since 1954, although it might not have occurred when it did except for a specific foreign interest in its execution.

During the 1960's, three alternative routes to national development confronted the Cambodian government. The first involved a sharp reduction in foreign expenditures to curtail foreign penetration of the Cambodian market, price controls, production incentives and ideological mobilization for sustained autarchy, and industrial development. This was a difficult political policy at a time when the superpowers were competing for hegemony in the third-world states and markets. Nevertheless, its advocates believed total self-sufficiency was the only corrective for Cambodia's poorly integrated national economy, formerly one part of French Indochina, and her only hope for continued national independence.

A second developmental scheme theoretically incorporated many elements of autarchy on the sub-national level while advocating an active search for additional, foreign revenues on a state level. Prince Sihanouk, who favored this approach, urged intensive development of the tourist industry, the creation of a free

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<sup>1</sup> T. D. Allman, "Who Tripped Sihanouk?" *Manchester Guardian*, September 6, 1971.

(French) franc trading zone in Sihanoukville (Kompong Son), and, in 1969, the use of multilateral development loans. His program of building up national resources while consuming foreign resources embodied two fundamental contradictions. On the mass level, he permitted limited free trade along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border, thus removing the pressure or the incentives to produce locally what could be purchased from the Vietnamese. On the elite level, the Prince asked for a radical reform of administrative values and organization in advocating autarchic programs; at the same time, his interest in obtaining foreign assistance suggested that he was not totally committed to reform. From the point of view of the bureaucracy and the army, there was little incentive to reduce inefficiency, freeze salaries or payrolls, curtail corruption, limit expenditures and redirect resources from the tertiary to the primary sector if an "era of plenty"—foreign aid for all—was about to return. Few individuals or ministries were prepared to be the first to cut back lest they be disadvantaged in the pending scramble for foreign largesse.<sup>2</sup> The effect of the relative deprivation created by the extended economic crisis was to place private interests above those of the public.

The third possibility discussed by Cambodian elites was to seek the foreign aid required to maintain and to expand existing programs and structures and to forgo the difficult administrative reforms and policies required to generate more national resources. Hardly a program for development, this alternative masked a preference for non-development and preservation of the existing socio-economic status quo. Populist and autarchic rhetoric notwithstanding, the status quo under the Sihanouk regime favored the urban, administrative middle classes. The lack of sustained attention to agrarian and industrial sectors had, in fact, produced the inevitable economic crunch; it was unrealistic for the national administration to expect substan-

tial increases in food production and stable, low food prices without concerted investment in agricultural technology and agrarian credit programs or foreign subsidiaries. Agricultural production costs rose throughout the 1960's in proportion to soil deterioration, population increases and inflationary pressures on the primary sector. By the end of the decade, state-imposed price controls in the absence of capital investment and development affected the distribution of basic foodstuffs and produced some food shortages.

The situation ultimately accrued to the benefit of the Vietnamese (both the revolutionaries and Saigon's entrepreneurs). Rather than sell produce in Cambodian markets at state-imposed prices, Cambodian farmers and urban speculators sold produce on the open market on the South Vietnamese border. The resulting loss of export revenues to the Cambodian state is suggested by the fact that about 50 per cent of all foreign exchange revenues in 1963 were earned from rice sales. This represented 16.4 per cent of Cambodia's total production. By 1969, Cambodia "exported" only 4.1 per cent of her rice crop, and rice shortages in Phnom Penh prompted the Cabinet to make plans to import rice to feed the city. These export losses were not made up by the increased exportation of other commodities.<sup>3</sup>

Sihanouk was quick to point out to those who advocated reliance on foreign aid as a palliative for the state's poverty that no offers of foreign aid from the United States were outstanding and that reforms and sacrifices were essential for long-term survival. Cambodia's real problem was the mentality of her elite, he charged, and to emphasize this message, he threatened to cut civil service salaries. Nevertheless, and in spite of princely threats, foreign assistance was the favored solution in official Phnom Penh because it promised less coercion, sacrifice, conflict, work or responsibility and more wealth than any conceivable alternative.

Official apathy and lack of policy initiative bordering on opportunism were indications of how thoroughly Sihanouk had single-handedly managed the Cambodian state since 1954. Politicians and bureaucrats alike lacked the experience and the responsibilities of political power.<sup>4</sup> Both politicians and bureaucrats were resentful of the absence of opportunities for political participation. Yet the rewards of paternalistic government through the years had become so routinized that the administration regarded them as acquired rights and essential aspects of government "service." In this context, the concept of sacrifice for the generalized improvement of the standard of living of the whole of Cambodian society or the suggestion of new authority relationships were radical, if not revolutionary, views. The progressive intellectuals and politicians who advocated the puritanical, egalitarian, hard-working and self-supporting policies of autarchy posed

<sup>2</sup> The expressions "era of plenty" and "days of abundance" signify an earlier period of American aid in Cambodia between 1955 and 1963. The programs, nearly all defense or defense-support projects, were riddled with honest graft and fraud. After 1963, the Sihanouk regime failed to reinforce the managerial, technological and professional ideologies encouraged by the Americans or to provide economic resources for the preservation or expansion of some of these projects. Consequently, many Cambodian officials referred to this period with pronounced nostalgia as "the days of abundance." The oft-repeated wish, accompanied by fading and exaggerated memories, fathered unrealistic expectations of the nature of renewed economic and political relations with the United States.

<sup>3</sup> See Sihanouk's report to a special national congress on August 4, 1969, in *Les Paroles de Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk; Juillet-Septembre, 1969* (Phnom Penh: Ministry of Information, 1969), pp. 343-352.

<sup>4</sup> This is a critical factor in the policy outlook and political behavior of Cambodian bureaucrats because the civil service was organized, recruited and trained by a foreign, French colonial administration for anti-national purposes. After independence, there was no major change in personnel or in administrative procedure, only generalized expansion.



a profound threat to the cosmopolitan life styles and political pecking order in Phnom Penh.

Prince Sihanouk was caught between the two groups. On the one hand, he realized that individual self-sufficiency and increased productivity would erode his traditional, patron-style political authority. On the other hand, procuring foreign monies in amounts dreamed about was tantamount to recommitting Cambodia's political future (and her monarchy) to foreign, colonial control. Of the two groups, Sihanouk apparently reasoned that the progressives were the more dangerous. The conservatives accepted the paternalistic authoritarianism of the Sihanouk regime and preferred its established order of rewards to the responsibilities of a more egalitarian, participatory society. Consequently, either in alliance with or under pressure from Lon Nol, Sihanouk eliminated the progressives from his regime, tagging them "Khmers Rouges" in the process. He then attempted to strike a comfortable balance between reform and foreign assistance as a means of resolving Cambodia's developmental crisis, but this balance was never attained.<sup>5</sup>

In 1969, most of Southeast Asia interpreted the an-

<sup>5</sup> The creation of the expression *Khmae Krahaom* (Khmer Rouge in French; Red Cambodian in English) is an instructive example of ideological manipulation. The Cambodian progressives, posing the only fundamental challenge to the established paternalistic order, were revolutionaries in the sociological sense of the word. Rather than calling them "progressives," as they called themselves, or attempting to discredit their positions on important issues, Prince Sihanouk made the facile transformation of revolutionary into Communist. Thus he invoked the sympathy of all individuals and states which equated subversion of the established order with communism and avoided the possibly embarrassing question of whether or not the Sihanouk regime ought to have been reformed radically (subverted) or reformed only moderately, which he proposed to do and which the progressives said was impossible. A minority of the progressives were Communist. Most defended socialist and humanitarian values and, on the whole, their ideological style, essential populism and personal integrity more closely approximated the puritan revolutionary tradition in England than European continental traditions.

Cambodian officials were not alone in perceiving the nature of the progressive alternative. During my visit with a Cambodian friend in the Kompong Speu-Kirirom region in late 1971, several farmers and townspeople explained to me how the war affected their lives and livelihoods. Most of them expressed their hope for Sihanouk's speedy return to power. Because there had been no war until the 1970 coup, they thought peace would return the moment the Prince came back. One farmer remarked that his fine new water buffalo wouldn't have cost so much if Prince Sihanouk were still in power and peace restored. I asked him what the *Khmae Krahaom* stood for. He was noticeably surprised by the question, but paused thoughtfully and proceeded to characterize the progressives as very honest above all else, hard-working and anti-Buddhist. He paused again, laughed modestly and added that he could never be a progressive because he didn't want to work that hard! This was a clever way of demonstrating peasant awareness of political options. I was made to understand that peasants were both honest enough and secular enough to create a lot of revolution for any corrupt, magico-religious government or foreign power which provoked them into working at it.

<sup>6</sup> The best description of Sihanouk's four years of concerted efforts to obtain international guarantees of Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity within Cambodia's (French-defined) frontiers is Roger M. Smith, *Cambodia's Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965).

nouncement of the Nixon Doctrine as a promise, but Cambodians perceived both a threat and an invitation. The exact meaning of the doctrine, summarized with the vague formula of "helping Asians help each other," was never spelled out. This vagueness appeared to serve the dual-purpose of dramatizing the end of the American combat role in Indochina while telling pro-American regimes that American money, technology, arms, prestige, and diplomatic support were indefinitely committed to Asians who would help each other carry on the war in defense of their own and the American cause. For the American public, troop withdrawals were confused with "ending the war" and "winding down the war," allowing President Richard Nixon to claim the title of "peacemaker" while continuing to wage war by long-distance proxy.

On the international level, defense of the procedural principle of not letting down an "ally" cast the United States in a kind of tough, maverick role. There were few more clever ways of negotiating from strength (and, it appears, from the implied threat of irrational military retaliation in the absence of compliance) than to continue to prosecute the war in this fashion after international consensus held that it was perhaps immoral and probably unwindable. In the best of all conceivable worlds, the Nixon Doctrine would have the last word if, in the course of fabricating an era of peace through tacit intimidation, a local military victory in Vietnam were secured. In any event, the American giant could not be exposed to any further humiliation in the course of trying to win a military victory. "Peace" could be public; war had to be clandestine. Throughout 1968 and 1969, American military analysts insisted that the principal obstacle to winning the war was Cambodia.

The sanctuaries and the increasing Vietnamese use of Cambodian territory were also a source of anxiety for Prince Sihanouk and the Cambodian government. When the initial agreements between the Vietnamese and Cambodian governments were reached, Prince Sihanouk believed that the Vietnamese revolutionaries would win the war in a relatively short time. Consequently, it was incumbent upon the Cambodians to accommodate their very powerful neighbor, and to profit from short-term Vietnamese military needs to secure an agreement in principle that Cambodian territory within Cambodia's present boundaries would be respected during and after the war. Cambodia had tried and failed to obtain similar assurances from the Saigon and Bangkok governments and from their American ally. American reluctance to acknowledge Cambodia's neutrality, integrity and independence created the suspicion that the United States either supported or acquiesced in Thai and South Vietnamese irredentist claims to Cambodian territory.<sup>6</sup> Under these circumstances, prudence dictated a partial accommodation with the socialist powers, lest the con-



tinued pleas for bipolar international guarantees leave Cambodia isolated and vulnerable. Not only were the Vietnamese revolutionaries perceived to be likely to win the war; their victory appeared to be in Cambodia's national interest.

When the United States persisted in and increased its ground and aerial interventions through 1969, however, the hazards of Cambodia's 1965 arrangements with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Front for the National Liberation of South Vietnam became apparent. The Vietnamese presence was assuming an aspect of permanence, arousing traditional anxieties over Vietnamese expansionism; free trade on the border deepened Cambodia's economic crisis; and "hot pursuit" by American and South Vietnamese forces posed a direct threat to Cambodian security and territorial integrity. Observing the increasing use of American air power in Laos and in Vietnam after the Tet Offensive, Sihanouk doubted that the Vietnamese revolutionaries could win a decisive military victory in the light of American determination not to lose. Air war and United States war by proxy called for new accommodations with both the Americans and the Vietnamese. If its foreign policy were not adjusted to prolonged war, the Cambodian government feared national collapse, economic chaos and an American-South Vietnamese invasion.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Former Ambassador Chester Bowles advised Prince Sihanouk of American plans for an invasion when he was on a special mission to Cambodia for the Lyndon Johnson administration in January, 1968.

<sup>8</sup> The designation "beneficiary" emerges in a French journalist's account of an interview with an anonymous American embassy expert in Saigon in August, 1969. The official is quoted as saying that the infrastructure and extent of North Vietnamese penetration in Cambodia favor the formation of a "Free Montagnard Republic" which would reduce Saigon's authority. He continued to emphasize that Prince Sihanouk was aware of the Vietnamese threat (to Saigon?) but asked rhetorically whether the Prince would have the means to force the North Vietnamese to withdraw their forces when the problem of the effective neutralization of Cambodia arose. See "Le Virus Vietnamien Menace la Paix," *L'express*, 11-17 Aout, 1969, p. 24.

<sup>9</sup> These 3,800 attacks were carefully coordinated by the National Security Council in the White House, according to Henry Kissinger in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during hearings on his nomination as Secretary of State. NBC TV News, September 10, 1973.

<sup>10</sup> This appears to have been unanticipated. Pre-invasion planning set no time limit on the operation and focused on ARVN's incapacity to manage the ground situation without American participation. See Peter Poole, *The Expansion of the Vietnam War into Cambodia* (Athens: Ohio University Southeast Asia Series, no. 17, 1970). There is irony in this if it is true that President Nixon viewed the Cambodian coup and subsequent events as a possible "opportunity to demonstrate to Communist leaders around the world that his hands were not completely tied by anti-war opinion in the United States and that he was able to meet force with force when necessary." See Poole, pp. 30-31. Following the discussion of the Nixon Doctrine above, I would argue that this might be the President's "cover story," leaked as it was to *The New York Times* after congressional action. The President's crisis behavior, described in detail by Poole, more probably relates to his anticipation of a dramatic military victory.

\* Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).

In mid-1969, Cambodia was the "beneficiary" of the Nixon Doctrine, not yet its model.<sup>8</sup> Sihanouk was powerless to constrain the secret American B-52 bombings which began on March 18, 1969,<sup>9</sup> though he did manage to obtain American recognition of Cambodia's neutrality within her present frontiers, perhaps in exchange for not exposing the raids and probably in exchange for United States intelligence on Vietnamese troop movements. The bombing coincided with Sihanouk's first public criticism of Vietnamese use of Cambodian territory. Later, Sihanouk both advised and warned the Vietnamese that pushing him too hard would result in a military takeover in Phnom Penh.

At one point, Prince Sihanouk cut off the shipment of Vietnamese supplies through Sihanoukville, apparently in order to negotiate for a sort of military aid for Lon Nol's army, but this aid barely compared with the visions of guns and butter nourished by Phnom Penh conservatives, visions of "development" à la Saigon, military support for putting down rural insurgency and for evicting the Vietnamese revolutionaries from their Cambodian bases. Unknown to Sihanouk, the conspiracy against him was three months old when the clandestine B-52 bombings began. If the Prince considered manipulating United States military desires for securing diplomatic recognition and political support for his regime, it must be emphasized that the Nixon administration was decidedly unresponsive. Several years of reconnaissance missions, hot pursuits and border bombings had already informed the American military that it would be necessary to occupy the "sanctuaries" to render them useless. In Phnom Penh, the initial impetus for the coup came from members of the Khmer Krom community with close links to United States Special Forces in South Vietnam. They knew, as did the Nixon administration, that Prince Sihanouk was not about to replace one occupying army with another which he trusted much less.

President Nixon mishandled the May, 1970, invasion. By announcing it in advance he made it possible for the American public to witness the continuing and widening war via telstar. Public and congressional reaction meant that the South Vietnamese had to occupy eastern Cambodia without American ground support after June 30, 1970.<sup>10</sup> The coup alone might not have precipitated a civil war, but the violent invasion and subsequent 17-month occupation of heavily populated areas of eastern Cambodia made it difficult to avoid. The Saigon army burned, pillaged, looted, raped and bullied the Cambodians and their countryside. The consequences of ARVN\* occupation and continuing American bombings were directly realized in the increasing troop levels of Prince Sihanouk's National United Front Army. On December 4, 1971, after ARVN forces had withdrawn to South Vietnam, Lon Nol's army suffered a decisive military defeat.

The following week, President Nixon declared that

Cambodia embodied the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form. In characteristic hyperbole, the President informed his Phnom Penh and American constituencies of his commitment to continuing the war, in the first instance, and to letting Asians (Cambodians, Vietnamese and Thais) handle the matter for themselves, in the second. More profoundly, he acknowledged Phnom Penh's *raison d'être* to be more purely supranational, now more firmly in line with and dependent upon the doctrine. The Phnom Penh regime could avoid the effects and the public acknowledgement of defeat as long as the war continued in Vietnam and as long as it could hold the city. The doctrine, which first targeted Cambodia as instrumental to United States military strategy, was also able to rationalize Lon Nol's defeat. Non-victory in Cambodia and non-defeat (of the city) were acceptable because implementation of the doctrine was indistinguishable in a sense from its objective. Winning the war meant waging war. Waging war was winning it and the war to be won was always in Vietnam.

The doctrine's fundamental weakness, however, was its neglect of Cambodian nationalism. In the process of intervening in Cambodia to win in Vietnam, American-sponsored military and racial pressures on rural Cambodians produced national reaction and resistance. It was not by any means historically necessary that Cambodia should experience wide-spread revolt or revolution. Although there were conflicts in the pre-coup period, no national uprising on the scale observed since 1971 was foreseen. The Cambodian liberation forces seem to have been created by the military logic of foreign intervention.

### IMPOSSIBILITY OF PEACE OR VICTORY

<sup>11</sup> The Nixon administration refused to accept Prince Sihanouk's invitation for negotiations in January and February, 1973. In addition, it continued shipping military supplies to Sihanoukville after the Paris agreements went into effect and quietly resumed American air strikes only nine days after an announced bombing halt. A careful examination of public documents suggests that a de facto cease-fire (officially ordered by all sides) did obtain in Cambodia after January 28, and that the Phnom Penh regime broke it. For some details on the implementations of the Paris Accords in South Vietnam and Cambodia, see the testimonies and supporting statements of D. Gareth Porter and Laura Summers in hearings on S. 1443 before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 4, 1973.

<sup>12</sup> This tonnage represents 50 per cent more than the conventional explosives dropped on Japan during World War II. In spite of this ecological destruction, the bombing had little effect on the military capacity of the Cambodian guerrillas. See *The New York Times*, August 15, 1973. In geographical size and population, Cambodia is a rough approximation of the state of Missouri.

<sup>13</sup> *Minneapolis Tribune*, September 5, 1973 (*New York Times News Service* dispatch).

<sup>14</sup> Jacques Leslie quotes an unidentified diplomat in Phnom Penh who said, "The United States feels Lon Nol shouldn't step down unless the Cambodian government gets something in return from the insurgents. . . . In terms of bargaining, he's worth something." *Los Angeles Times*, August 26, 1973.

The failure of the doctrine was apparent when the Nixon administration made public "peace" with the Vietnamese revolutionaries in Paris in January, 1973, while refusing to negotiate with Prince Sihanouk.<sup>11</sup> After suffering diplomatic and military rebuffs, the Cambodian revolutionaries gathered their forces to cut off Phnom Penh's food and military supplies and possibly to attack the city. Consequently, between March and August, 1973, United States B-52 bombers pounded Cambodia for 160 consecutive days, dropping more than 240,000 short tons of bombs on rice fields, water buffalo, villages (particularly along the Mekong river) and on such troop positions as the guerrillas might maintain.<sup>12</sup> No reference to the formula bearing the President's name justified or rationalized these attacks. When it was no longer possible to use Cambodia to canonize a Nixon peace or a Nixon victory, the doctrine itself had to be abandoned. Afterward, the American Ambassador in Phnom Penh was asked whether he thought the "overall American policy objective" in Cambodia had been achieved during his three-year tenure. He responded frankly:

The Khmer Republic and its armed forces contributed significantly to the Vietnamization of the war in Vietnam and thus to the disengagement of our own forces . . . there have been between 25,000 and 26,000 Khmer (i.e., Phnom Penh) troops killed, and time was bought for the success of our program in Vietnam.<sup>13</sup>

The prospects for an end to the fighting in Cambodia thus seem to depend on the time required "for the success" of the Nixon administration's program in Vietnam or on the capacity of the Cambodian revolutionaries to force Lon Nol to capitulate. In the meantime, no negotiations for a compromise settlement appear possible. The United States refuses to deal directly with Prince Sihanouk or representatives of his coalition, or to bow to the requests of Phnom Penh's now discouraged conservatives, who advocate replacing Lon Nol as a step toward peace and national reconciliation.<sup>14</sup> For their part, the Cambodian revolutionaries now say they are fighting for total victory. Approximately 90 per cent of Cambodia is already under their administration and, they argue, negotiations at this stage would attribute more political and mil-

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*A recent statement of the new United States Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, has made it clear "that the United States would retain its military options [and] its strong base in Thailand. . . . The statement left little doubt that those who looked to United States military withdrawal from Southeast Asia would have to await the end of the Nixon administration. American disengagement in Southeast Asia was still posture, not reality."*

## Thailand: Groping toward Neutrality

BY L. EDWARD SHUCK

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NEW AND UNDENIABLE PRESSURES have rapidly surfaced among the traditional power brokers of Southeast Asia. Native anti-establishment and anti-foreign political groups in Indochina are successfully withstanding massive foreign military efforts to influence political change. Changing allegiance patterns, national and international, can no longer be contained by interfering foreigners.

In Thailand, politics by intrigue among customary cliques can no longer easily influence internal or foreign policies. The epoch of medieval palace revolts which laced Thai history after 1932, almost totally insulated by popular apathy and by traditional lack of wide public involvement, is drawing to a close. The very pervasiveness of military clique domination invites resistance from an increasingly disgruntled and better organized popular opposition, now apparent in the south, the north, and the southeast as well as in the long-restless northeast<sup>1</sup> and among university students.

This is not to suggest that the Royal Thai government is hovering on the brink of collapse or that it is in the condition of a Lon Nol or a Thieu regime. But increasing numbers of Thai have abandoned

their traditional disinterest in government affairs.<sup>2</sup>

Throughout seven centuries, the closely knit and proud subjects of the Kings of the Thai moved southward, west, and east, carving out their present holdings at the expense of the subjects of the Kings of Burma, the Kings of the Khmer, their Lao cousins, and those of the Malay Rajahs to the south. The only significant bloc to their eastward expansion, other than the heartland of the Khmers, came from the strong-willed Viets; and Thai-Vietnamese enmity remains persistent in the pattern of life in Southeast Asia.

In recent centuries, the wisely led and internally secure Kingdom of the Thai was able to protect itself—aided by geography and the grasping winner-take-all nature of Western intrusion—from the cultural and institutional distortions foisted upon Burmese, Viet, Khmer, and Malay by invading interlopers from beyond the region. In the generation since World War II, Thailand has often seemed an island of security, internal tranquility, and prosperity in a sea of discontent, confusion, revolutionary change. But this was a postponement; and did not represent a lasting immunity from such turmoil.

In recent years, neglect by Bangkok, plus open insurgency throughout Southeast Asia against the old order, have begun to threaten the traditionalist/military internal security of the dominating classes.<sup>3</sup> Traditional Thai diplomacy was also deceived in part by its own brittle dependence upon military force into counting on a lasting American military presence in the region, a presence which inevitably must end. The international policies of Thailand for centuries were succinctly characterized by the famous

<sup>1</sup> Note a very good report by David Jenkins, "The New Frontier," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 4, 1973. One might also note the report of Malcolm Browne, *The New York Times*, August 8, 1973.

<sup>2</sup> Actions of the National Student Centre, for example, were reviewed in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 28, 1973. See also David Morrell, "Thailand," *Asian Survey*, February, 1973. This offers a good analysis of the changing political attitudes within Thailand.

<sup>3</sup> See for example Peter F. Bell, "Notes on Thailand's Northwest, Regional Development, Insurgency, and Official Responses," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 42, No. 1, Spring, 1969. Note, as well, "Symposium on Northeast Thailand," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 6-7, July, 1966.



1942 remark of Phibun Songkhram, made with reference to World War II, but more precisely a generic observation, "Which side do you think will be defeated in the war? That side is our enemy."<sup>4</sup> Military postures and adventures, however, can no longer provide either security or control in the region of Southeast Asia.

A dangerous element in the Thai position is the lack of neutrality within the context of Southeast Asian regionalism. While its neighbors were fashioning neutral poses with respect to the superpowers, the thrust of Thai international actions and policies remained ambivalent. While paying lip service to independence and seeking leadership in regional affairs, the Thai government simultaneously became a client/agent of the United States, irretrievably entwined in American military plans in Southeast Asia. There remained in Thai political gaming—still a metropolitan and upper-class pastime—a striking lack of any authentic neutrality. The military clique benefited materially as the coy mistress of the Pentagon. No amount of protestations of independence by Thai leaders can obscure this politico-military-economic fact of recent Thai existence. And the nature of the Thai commitment to the United States went far beyond the mere superficial diplomatic liaisons in which Thai governments long sought security when they were caught in the battlegrounds and battles of the greater powers.

The Thai government in 1973 is faced with the extremely difficult task of developing an authentic neutrality and disengaging itself from its one-sided support of American policies and activities. Without securing a believable posture of neutrality, Thai leadership possibilities in Southeast Asian regional activities will be stillborn, or condemned by congenital defects.

In September and October, 1950, United States-Thai agreements committed the United States to a generation of providing arms and economic support, and building bases within Thailand. The latter were constructed under special agreements with the Thai governments which allowed their use by the United States while preserving Thai ownership. The Rusk-

Thanat Joint Statement of March 6, 1962, assured the Thai that the United States would undertake indefinite and not specifically limited expenditures in assisting the Thai to combat "Communist armed attack."<sup>5</sup> This elaborated upon the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO) of September, 1954. On the basis of the generalities of these assurances to protect Thailand from communism, a massive input of American funds and artifacts, weaponry and troops entered Thailand. The hiring by the United States of Thai troops to fight in Vietnam and Laos was sustained for more than a decade. Repeated guarantees of military support to Thailand were given through the years by American leaders, notably during vice-presidential visits by Hubert Humphrey<sup>6</sup> and Spiro Agnew.<sup>7</sup>

Though the gifts were one-sided and the agreements were less than full-fledged treaties, Thailand seemed to nestle securely in the American nest. Between 1950 and 1972, the United States gave Thailand \$11 billion in direct military aid alone. Thai officers and non-coms in increasing numbers were trained at least partially in the United States. Thai troops were "advised" and amply accoutered through the United States Military Aid Mission in Bangkok. The stationing of American military units, especially in the northeast of the country, dates from at least 1962. These units organized communications and military strength both for Thailand herself and for the efficient support of American war efforts in Indochina. In 1965, the United States commenced the construction of the Sattahip/Utapao air-sea base complex, which became the largest United States establishment in Southeast Asia after the bases in Saigon were turned over to the Saigon regime. American-provided air operations resources were enlarged to seven air fields by 1968.<sup>8</sup> In terms of internal politics, American air forces were flying Thai troops about the country in combat operations against dissidents as early as 1967.<sup>9</sup>

The United States government incited and paid the Thai to wage war—unprovoked war—against the anti-Saigon Vietnamese, against the Pathet Lao and, later, against the anti-Lon Nol forces in the Khmer Republic. The Thai, with eyes wide open, rekindled ancient feuds with their neighbors, this time at the beckoning of an intruding foreign power. Thai dependence upon American money and military power remained clear and unqualified in mid-1973.<sup>10</sup> In the Thai manner, the government essayed the role of unreserved American ally in the Indochinese fighting as long as the American military seemed likely to "win" and as long as the American public seemed broadly committed to White House policies.

#### THE 1968 CONSTITUTION

As insurance, especially after 1968, other forces

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, David A. Wilson, *Politics in Thailand* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962) p. 20.

<sup>5</sup> A basic document for this relationship is the United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings of the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, *Kingdom of Thailand* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), esp. pp. 613-677.

<sup>6</sup> *The New York Times*, February 14, 1967.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, January 4, 1970, August 10, 1970, and February 3, 1973.

<sup>8</sup> Hearings, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 878-890.

<sup>9</sup> *The New York Times*, December 8, 1968.

<sup>10</sup> See George J. Viksnins, "The United States Military Spending in Thailand and the Economy of Thailand," *Asian Survey*, May, 1973, for a far more complete analysis of the effect of the tide of American expenditures within Thailand.



seemed to stir. The reign of the military clique under martial law was modified in 1968 with the promulgation of still another constitution and the promise of an election in early 1969. While the constitution, in essence, merely confirmed the control of the military clique, led by Thanom Kittikachorn,<sup>11</sup> a new openness was temporarily permitted. Martial law was lifted; political parties were permitted to surface. Though these are only clubby coteries of Bangkok elitists, they generally represent the spectrum of the political and non-revolutionary organizations and leaders within the kingdom. In February, 1969, the House of Representatives was elected on schedule, and a Senate was appointed, as was directed by the new constitution.

Agitation about the dangers of overinvolvement in the American crusade in Indochina was publicly ventilated. The presence in southern Vietnam of the Thai division was questioned. Requests were publicized that Thai leaders resurvey the future of Thai-Vietnamese and Thai-Chinese relations as the administration of United States President Richard Nixon promised the broad withdrawal of American ground forces from Indochina. Many Thai were obviously in a mood to back down a bit from the hard-line anti-Marxist stands of the mid- and late-1960's. They seemed to become more sensitive to occasional warnings from Peking—going back to 1965—that Thai military cooperation with the United States was dangerous for Thailand. In 1965, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi had bluntly predicted the development of an anti-government guerrilla movement in Thailand.

In May, 1971, while discussing a 1968 mission to Japan, Foreign Minister Thanat revealed that during that visit he had also discreetly begun conversations with the representatives of Peking designed to improve relations between Thailand and China. Publicly requesting the government-owned Thai radio to ease its antagonistic attitudes toward the Marxist countries, the Foreign Ministry observed that the Chinese were toning down their own diatribes directed against Thailand. Thanat called attention to the purported news that Hanoi- and Peking-backed guerrilla attacks on government installations in the northeast were decreasing.

Thanat sought an enlarged Thai role in regional affairs, one introspective in demeanor and not con-

stantly colored by and geared to the anti-Communist crusade of the United States. Gestures included attempts to improve relations with Malaysia and Indonesia, and expansion of the Thai role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Thanat's line of action was interrupted by the startling coup of November, 1971. The military clique moved forcefully to dominate the rate of change in Thai policy until a clearer perception of the future United States presence and power in Southeast Asia could be discerned. The November coup set aside the constitution, reestablished martial law, created a nine-man Revolutionary Council (only one member of which, Pote Sarasin, was a civilian) and dropped Thanat Khoman from his highly visible position as Thailand's foreign minister.<sup>12</sup> All these actions surely were rooted in the assumption that the Nixon administration would continue its military presence in Southeast Asia and bludgeon the anti-Saigon forces into quiescence. Strong support of the United States and of anti-communism as doctrine was reiterated. The assumption that there had been specific guarantees from the Nixon administration was strengthened by the 1972 and 1973 build-up of American forces in Thailand. Further, the December, 1972, movement of "Pentagon East" from Saigon to Nakhon Phanom, across the Mekong River from Thakhek and 60 miles down river from Vientiane, had an air of permanence regardless of any shifting of total numbers of ground personnel in Southeast Asia.<sup>13</sup> The withdrawal of American ground and non-combat forces from southern Vietnam was more precisely a regrouping of usable and relevant military forces—to wit, the air forces—from Vietnam to the new Southeast Asian bastion of the United States—Thailand.

In addition to air strikes in Vietnam and Cambodia, American operations in Laos, including the funding of Thai troops to fight in Laos, also increased in 1972 and 1973.<sup>14</sup> According to United States government figures, the numerical peak of American-paid Thai troops in Laos reached 17,000 in early 1973. In the summer of 1973, the Thai military voiced an intent to cut this figure drastically, to as few as 3,000 by the end of August.

With Thailand entrapped in a war on the side which could endure only as long as the United States paid the bills and supplied the military muscle, the Thai government played out a long-run gamble. The Nixon administration dramatically lost both popularity and considerable decision-making initiative in 1973, its power eroded both by American disenchantment with the war and American disgust with the revelations of the so-called Watergate investigations. Subsequent Thai soul-searching ran deeper.

#### CHANGING DIPLOMATIC STANCE

In terms of altering the diplomatic stance to en-

<sup>11</sup> Embassy of Thailand, Washington, D.C., 1969, *Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand*, as translated by Kamol Sanhikshetrin, 1969.

<sup>12</sup> See David Morrell, "Thailand Military Checkmate," *Asian Survey*, Vol. III, No. 2, February, 1972, for varying points of view about the coup.

<sup>13</sup> See the excellent article by Frank Darling in *Current History*, December, 1972, "Thailand and the Early Post-Vietnam Era."

<sup>14</sup> See *The New York Times*, May 8, 1972, and August 1, 1973, for a comparison of the figures, e.g., \$100 million spent to pay and maintain Thai troops in 1972, \$116 million in 1973.

hance a position in regional deliberations, Pote Sarasin addressed the United Nations General Assembly in October, 1972, in strong praise of neutrality as the destiny of Southeast Asia. He quoted the ASEAN Kuala Lumpur Declaration of November, 1971, which had asked that the region be turned into a "zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality," free from what Pote identified as "any form or manner of interference by outside powers." He also referred back 18 years to the principles expressed at the Bandung Conference of 1955 which supported non-involvement or "third-force" tendencies and peaceful coexistence.<sup>15</sup>

The Thai government increasingly attempted to assume a Janus-like foreign posture. Its goals of increased friendship with regional neighbors and a *modus operandi* with China were pursued. Though Henry Kissinger, then President Nixon's adviser on national security affairs, could feel justified in stating in October, 1972: "the United States-Hanoi Agreement for Indochina imposes no limitation on United States forces in Thailand,"<sup>16</sup> Thailand's desires for disengagement from her relationship with the Pentagon were increasingly obvious. Thai restlessness seemed to be in direct ratio to the Nixon administration's lessening ability to focus American purpose and to carry through its obviously military-based policies in Southeast Asia.

Thanat Khoman was restored to an important informal role by his appointment to a new National Assembly, created under authority of an interim constitution decreed by the National Executive Council on December 15, 1972. Thanat was given the go-ahead to make statements of opposition to pro-United States tendencies within the Thai political spectrum. One recalls his November, 1972, statement that: "Thailand must be more realistic" and revise her policy toward the United States.<sup>17</sup> It is possible that Thanat was being groomed as a transitional personality who could preserve military-clique continuity of power through a flip-flop in Thai foreign policy.

In this light, an article by Thanat which appeared on the so-called Op Ed page of *The New York Times* on June 7, 1973, was revealing. In this article, the former Foreign Minister criticized the continuing use of Thailand as a base for American military attacks upon Indochina and deplored Thailand's being used as a pawn in American military ventures in Southeast

Asia. After ten years of operating under the written agreements by which the Thai government welcomed the presence of American military force in Thailand, the man who helped draw up these agreements and understandings, apparently compelled toward policy reversal, sought to repudiate them. Note these examples of Thai diplomacy in Thanat's article:

By any legal standard, cease-fire violations cannot justify, still less exonerate, international law violations. These have been caused by aerial bombings originating from Thailand by American forces. This matter becomes even more serious for my country since it was not party either to the cease-fire agreements or the Paris Conference. The fact that the United States armed forces have been admitted by the Thai authorities on a verbal basis, without *written official agreements specifying the purposes, duration and other conditions of their stay, does not entitle them to commit acts of war against third parties with which Thailand is not in conflict.*\* By so doing, they implicate the host country in a de facto state of war without its consent or approval.

And later in the same article:

In my opinion, now is the time for both the United States and Thailand to cast off the cold war shackles and look ahead into the new world of coexistence and peaceful cooperation. Indeed, our two countries have much worthier objectives to work for than just one using the other as a launching pad for dropping bombs or recruiting "mercenaries" for fighting proxy wars.<sup>18</sup>

As the American withdrawal from southern Vietnam proceeded, Thailand sent a trade mission to China. General Praphas observed that the Taiwan Embassy in Bangkok was of no use to local overseas Chinese, and that (significantly) this Embassy "had been forced on Thailand because Thailand was a loser in World War II." He further indicated his desire for increased trade with the PRC.<sup>19</sup> Since Praphas was no lower than number two man in the military government, these rumblings from on high indicated restlessness and strenuous efforts by the Thai to extricate themselves from the American embrace.

Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn took the occasion of the signing of the Vietnam cease-fire on January 23, 1973, to state yet again his faith in the principles enunciated at Bandung in 1954 and in ASEAN meetings, especially:

There is a respect for the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries;

There is mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, freedom, and territorial integrity among nations. . . .

His Majesty's Government is pleased to assist to the fullest extent in the promotion of peace and international cooperation. To this end close consultations will be sought with the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.<sup>20</sup>

With military links to the United States remaining the most significant plank in Thai foreign policy, this

\* This italicized section is a misrepresentation of Thai political acts and attitudes, coming from a former negotiator of American military intervention in Southeast Asian affairs.

<sup>15</sup> Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, Press Release, no. 18, October 3, 1972.

<sup>16</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 4, 1972.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> *The New York Times*, Op Ed Page, June 7, 1973.

<sup>19</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 18, 1973.

<sup>20</sup> Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, Press Release #5, January 24, 1973.

last phrase has a touch of wistfulness. Recall at this juncture that there were still at least 17,000 Thai troops in Laos and that the massive American bombing of Indochina, from Thai bases, was to continue for another seven months—at least.<sup>21</sup>

The Thai government for all its vociferous support of American military operations in Southeast Asia—until the decline in power and status of Richard Nixon—and despite the proliferating military power of the United States within its borders, has almost poignantly used the safety valve of ASEAN to serve two pressing and clearly sighted long-run needs of Thai foreign policy. These are related one to the other; to provide leadership to an authentic Southeast Asian regional alliance in supplanting the ersatz SEATO, and to make peace with historic neighboring enemies or incipient enemies.

The 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration of ASEAN was reiterated at the Manila ASEAN Conference in July, 1972, as was the goal of neutralization of Southeast Asia.<sup>22</sup>

ASEAN foreign ministers met again in Kuala Lumpur in February, 1973, and welcomed enthusiastically the signing of the Vietnam cease-fire, while announcing that as an organization they desired to participate in the reconstruction of Indochina.<sup>23</sup>

At Kuala Lumpur, the Thai delegation requested another early meeting, and in Thailand. Such a meeting was held a few weeks later in April in Pattaya, a resort on the coast southeast of Bangkok. Premier Thanom Kittikachorn urgently requested that the delegates “collectively tackle the problems of security that have long plagued the stability of the region.” He also spoke of the need for “collective political security” in contrast to military security, reflecting at least a lefthanded admission that political problems were too complex to be shackled to the Communist-anti-Communist syndrome. Sensitive to continuing political (as well as military) threats and border disputes between Indonesia and the Philippines, and between Thailand and both Malaysia and Burma, Field Marshal Thanom requested the creation of a permanent ASEAN Central Secretariat as an instrument of peacemaking for mutually recognized problems. This idea was accepted, and Djakarta was to be the locus of the Permanent Secretariat.

As a backdrop to the pleasant speech-making at Pat-

taya, B-52 bombers were droning overhead, flying out of Thailand-owned bases in their destruction of Cambodian people and property.<sup>24</sup>

In the spring of 1973, the Thai government also tried to improve relations with Burma and Malaysia, relations shadowed in boundary disputes and sundry political differences. Chief among these was the harboring by Thailand of Burmese leader U Nu, who devoted himself to organizing opposition to the Burmese Military Council, and to stopping smuggling along the Thai-Burmese border, especially of opium. In April, the two governments agreed to spur the dormant Thai-Burmese Border Commission to work more energetically, and Thailand agreed to cease any semblance of aid to U Nu.<sup>25</sup> U Nu was asked to leave Thailand in July, 1973, after which date he headed for the United States. Negotiations were accelerated with the Malaysian government to resolve the problems created by the dissidents along the Kra Peninsula boundary. These remnants of the Malay Emergency of the 1950's had recently joined with anti-establishment groups of Thai. In July, also, the Thai government maneuvered the indefinite postponement of a previously negotiated state visit to Thailand of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu.

Indications of the confusion within the Thai ruling group became more prominent during the summer of 1973 as open discussion increased, pro and con, with regard to the continuing United States military presence and its activities in the country, the demands by the Thai that the United States increase military aid to Thailand and, especially, requests that the United States inform the Thai government of its future plans for Indochina. The military clique seemed to be in as much disarray as was the administration of President Nixon.

At the request of Thai officials, talks were initiated with the United States in August, 1973, to clarify American military aims. At this juncture, Thanat Khoman reflected a complete reversal of his 1960 views. He insisted that Thailand make her peace with North Vietnam, and that this could only develop after the removal of American military personnel from Thailand.<sup>26</sup>

On the occasion of a published joint United States-Thai statement in Bangkok to the effect that the two governments had agreed on early discussions to reduce

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<sup>21</sup> Excellent background reading for this relationship, it should be mentioned, is available in David A. Wilson, *The United States and the Future of Thailand* (New York: Praeger, 1970) esp., Chap. III.

<sup>22</sup> Government of Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur), *Foreign Affairs, Malaysia*, Vol. 5, No. 3, September, 1972.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. 6, no. 1, March, 1973, p. 6711.

<sup>24</sup> Note report of Harvey Stockman, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 23, 1973.

<sup>25</sup> See *ibid.*, May 14, 1973.

<sup>26</sup> *The New York Times*, August 19, 1973.

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*"Hailed as a model of multiracial cooperation before May, 1969, thereafter Malaysia rapidly became the subject of pessimistic evaluations. . . . Given the potential for violence of ethnic (and religious and linguistic) divisions . . . , it is remarkable that Malaysia has survived, let alone prospered to an appreciable degree."*

## Malaysia Today

BY R. S. MILNE AND DIANE K. MAUZY

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IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS Malaysia has undergone a distressing outbreak of racial violence (May, 1969), alterations in the constitution and in economic policy, a change of Prime Minister, a variation in the form of the ruling party coalition, and a major shift in the direction of foreign policy. Hailed as a model of multiracial cooperation before May, 1969, thereafter Malaysia rapidly became the subject of pessimistic evaluations. Malaysia is unique among Southeast Asian countries in having a high proportion of Chinese and Indian ethnic minorities. Over one-third of the population is of Chinese origin; the Chinese plus Indian proportion is about two-fifths. The Malays themselves, although constituting slightly over half of the population of peninsular Malaya, are slightly in the minority in the whole country, which also includes the Borneo states of Sarawak and Sabah. Given the potential for violence of ethnic (and religious and linguistic) divisions on this scale, it is remarkable that Malaysia has survived, let alone prospered to an appreciable degree.

<sup>1</sup> This applies to Malaya, later known as West Malaysia. The related Alliance parties in Sarawak and Sabah have different components. In Sabah, the Alliance party, under Tun Datu Haji Mustapha bin Datu Harun, is in tight control of the state. The Alliance, under Datuk Haji Abdul Rahman Ya'akub, also controls Sarawak, although in coalition with the Sarawak United People's party (R. S. Milne and K. J. Ratnam, *New States in a New Nation: Political Development in Sarawak and Sabah* (London: Cass, 1973), Ch. 3.

<sup>2</sup> The election in one seat was postponed. The elections in Sarawak and Sabah were still in progress when the Kuala Lumpur riots occurred following the May, 1969, elections in West Malaysia. They were postponed until 1970. In Sabah, the Alliance then won all 16 seats. In Sarawak, the Alliance won only 10 seats out of 24. On the 1969 elections in Malaya, see K. J. Ratnam and R. S. Milne, "The 1969 Elections in West Malaysia," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XLIII, No. 2 (1970), pp. 203-226. On the Sarawak and Sabah elections see R. S. Milne and K. J. Ratnam, *New States*, Ch. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Ratnam and Milne, "The 1969 Elections."

<sup>4</sup> Gerald P. Dartford, "Crisis in Malaysia," *Current History*, December, 1969, pp. 349-354, 367.

The events of May, 1969, were a shock to complacency. Previously, it looked as if Malaysia had hit on the happy device of a governing party, the Alliance, which was not itself ethnic, but was made up of three ethnic components, Malay (UMNO), Chinese (MCA), Indian (MIC).<sup>1</sup> Each of these three individual parties could make a grass-roots approach without sacrificing its ethnic appeal, while at the top levels there could be agreement among the party elites in non-publicized, and therefore non-inflammatory, bargaining sessions. In practice, the UMNO was the dominant party. The Malays regarded themselves as the "indigenous" people of Malaya and as the "heirs" of the colonizing British. This dominance was actually softened by the obviously human and "multiracial" personality of the country's first Prime Minister, Tengku Abdul Rahman ("the Tengku").

The opposition parties fell into two groups: several parties, mostly supported by non-Malays, of changing names and composition; the Pan-Malayan Islamic party (which later changed its name to Partai Islam), which, from its title, obviously relied on its appeal to Malays. However, the Alliance appealed to "moderate" voters of all races, and at the 1964 elections its support was increased by a favorable electoral reaction in the face of the current threat from the Indonesian Confrontation.

At the 1969 elections, however, the Alliance suffered losses. The elections in Malaya resulted in its winning only 66 parliamentary seats out of 103,<sup>2</sup> compared with 89 out of 104 in 1964. Explanations of these losses have been given elsewhere;<sup>3</sup> what was important were reactions to them. Demonstrations following the elections in Kuala Lumpur had the effect of sparking racial violence.<sup>4</sup>

The government's reactions to the crisis were partly short term: for instance, press censorship, a curfew,



suspension of meetings of Parliament and the creation of an *ad hoc* body, the National Operations Council (NOC) to govern alongside the Cabinet. But other long-term measures were introduced. One was the publication of the *Rukunegara*, a kind of national ideology, consisting of five principles. The *Rukunegara* was intended to be an instrument of nation-building, for overcoming communal loyalties by calling for a higher loyalty. However, it was also, intended to elicit obedience to the constitution and to set a limit to questioning some of its provisions. From 1957 to 1969 it was assumed that national harmony existed. Thereafter it was clear that harmony might not occur naturally, and that conflicts were bound to exist which, to use a phrase for a time favored by several ministers, could not be dealt with by "sweeping them under the rug." A new Department (later Ministry) of National Unity was also established. Another long-term measure concerned language, and in July, 1969, a timetable was announced for the gradual replacement of English by Malay in national primary schools which taught in the English medium.<sup>5</sup> Yet another expression of future policy took the form of the *Second Malaysia Plan*,<sup>6</sup> discussed later.

Parliament resumed its sittings after February, 1971. Its first major task was to amend the constitution in such a way as to put "sensitive" issues, such as citizenship, the national language, the special position of the Malays as compared with other ethnic groups, and the Malay Rulers' sovereignty, beyond challenge even during its own sessions. The government's rationale was that these sensitive issues were in effect *communal* issues, and that unrestrained discussion would almost certainly produce more communal violence.<sup>7</sup>

After early 1971, developments in Malaysia may be conveniently placed under four headings: changes inside each of the Alliance parties; changes in the nature of the ruling coalition; internal economic developments and their relation to the new orientations in general policy outlined above; Malaysia's role in ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) in promoting neutrality for the region.

#### DEVELOPMENTS INSIDE THE ALLIANCE PARTIES

Inside the UMNO, the dominant partner in the Alliance, the main event was the long-awaited resignation in September, 1970, of the prime ministership by Tengku Abdul Rahman, who had held that office since independence in 1957. Paradoxically, the

traumatic events of May, 1969, later diagnosed as having resulted from too much "sweeping-under-the-rug," made it imperative that the Tengku, the country's main symbol of multiracialism, should continue in office, although he had himself been not too active in looking under the surface of Malaysia's ethnic "harmony." He was succeeded, as expected, by his deputy, Tun Razak. Until his assumption of the prime ministership, Tun Razak had been looked on mainly as an eminently able administrator, but he has since had the chance to show that he also possesses wider qualities of leadership.

Later, interest centered on elections for the powerful UMNO positions below Tun Razak. His deputy in both the government and the UMNO was Tun (Dr.) Ismail, an experienced statesman of high quality but in indifferent health. In a contest at the party's General Assembly, June, 1972, three UMNO vice-presidents were elected after a keen fight. The result was of particular interest because of a new rule that the election was for a period of three years instead of one. The winning candidates were Tan Sri Sardon, who had long been a minister, Encik Ghafar Baba, a minister who was the former Chief Minister of Malacca, and Datuk Hussein Onn, Minister of Education.

The last of these was probably the greatest surprise, since he entered Parliament only in the 1969 election. He is Tun Razak's brother-in-law, is the son of Dato Onn, UMNO's founder, and was himself active at the party's inception, and is generally agreed to have performed well as the Education Minister. The losing candidates included two strong proponents of a Malay point of view, Mahathir bin Mohamad, author of *The Malay Dilemma*<sup>8</sup> and Tan Sri Syed Nasir, who had gained fame as director of the country's Language and Literature Agency. The other non-successful candidate was Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, Minister with Special Functions and of Information. The rapid rise of Datuk Hussein Onn on his return to politics continued in 1973. Tun Ismail died on August 2, and the major item in a Cabinet reshuffle announced on August 13 was Datuk Hussein's appointment as Deputy Prime Minister.

The position of the MCA has always been precarious. In return for assuring the Chinese some political access to government policy-making, the MCA has been obliged to compromise and to make some communal concessions. The *Straits Times* has noted that representing the MCA "is not an exercise in chauvinism."<sup>9</sup> But, as a result, the MCA faces the continuing dilemma of convincing the Chinese electorate that it can best represent the interests of the Chinese, in spite of or even because of its political compromises and moderation. The dilemma has led to an erosion of its mass support. The MCA faces the additional problem of demonstrating to UMNO that

<sup>5</sup> *Straits Times*, July 11, 1969.

<sup>6</sup> *Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1971).

<sup>7</sup> *Towards National Harmony* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1971), pp. 1-2.

<sup>8</sup> Mahathir bin Mohamad, *The Malay Dilemma* (Singapore: Donald Moore, 1970).

<sup>9</sup> *Straits Times*, May 22, 1973.

it is indeed capable of acting as the genuine representative of the Chinese community. Tun Razak has apparently indicated that he is willing to deal with the MCA alone only as long as the MCA can speak to the Chinese.<sup>10</sup> This problem has seemed all the more urgent with the recent UMNO-led Alliance-opposition party pacts which pose the danger of the MCA being effectively replaced as the spokesman for the Chinese community.

There have been several attempts to reform and revitalize the MCA, especially since early 1971. Typically, these efforts have had the result of pitting the "new blood reformers" against the entrenched "old guard," and a factional struggle has developed. This struggle has been a disagreement over policy objectives as well as a leadership fight.<sup>11</sup> The short-lived "Chinese Unity Movement," with MCA reorganization as one of its aims, sprang up in February, 1971. However, it frightened the old guard, and was subsequently undermined by it and faded out rapidly. In 1972, a "United Pan-Malaysian Chinese Guilds and Associations" organization was proposed, but has not successfully developed; and in late 1972 an MCA-led movement aimed at a "mental revolution" of the Chinese community also died out. As one observer commented, there "must first be a mental revolution within the MCA before it tries to sell the concept to the masses."<sup>12</sup>

The factional struggle within the MCA surfaced briefly when two top Perak state MCA leaders were expelled for opposing the Alliance-PPP coalition agreement referred to below. It became public in mid-1973 with the Cabinet resignation of Special Functions Minister Lim Keng Yaik, an MCA reformist, and his subsequent expulsion from the party. Reportedly, Lim resigned because of conflicts with the MCA old guard leadership. The June meeting of the MCA Central Working Committee served to reconfirm the power of the old guard to deal decisively with troublesome reformers, and the leadership confrontation which seemed to be developing was broken off abruptly. At the MCA General Assembly elections in August, 1973, all the top officials were returned unopposed.

Throughout the battle, party president and Minister of Finance Tun Tan Siew Sin has retained firm

control of the party's top position. Not quite unattached yet somehow above the fray, his leadership has seemed secure.

The MCA's problems remain basically unaltered: an eroded mass-support base, an adherence to the status quo despite the dangers sounded by the Alliance's coalition-building strategy, internal factional struggles, instability, and insufficient party discipline and, finally, nagging in the background, the problem already being posed of the eventual succession to Tun Tan Siew Sin.

The Indian component of the Alliance, the MIC, has been as unstable as the MCA. The main difference is that, while in the MCA the position of Tun Tan Siew Sin has been relatively assured, the MIC top leadership has been fiercely disputed between the president, Tun Sambanthan, and the Minister of Labour and Manpower, Tan Sri Manickavasagam. In June, 1973, Tun Sambanthan resigned from the MIC presidency, although he remained in the Cabinet.

#### THE NATIONAL FRONT

The changes in the party system arising from a change in the ruling coalition have already been described in detail in *Current History*.<sup>13</sup> In effect, the Alliance has remained in being, but has been supplemented by a wider, looser, coalition, the "National Front." The opposition parties in this coalition are the Sarawak United People's party (SUPP), the People's Progressive party (PPP), the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia and the Partai Islam.<sup>14</sup> In the first three cases, the party in question was primarily supported by non-Malays and was concentrated in a particular state where it was very strong by comparison with the MCA.<sup>15</sup> The coalition with Partai Islam is a little different. That party was in control of the state government of Kelantan, but was also strong in several other states, notably Trengganu and Kedah. In addition, the party is a Malay party. The other coalitions could be explained by saying that they were intended to repair the deficiencies of the MCA as representing Chinese opinion by giving Chinese more of a voice in government. The coalition with Partai Islam, effective from January 1, 1973, is less easily explained. From that party's point of view the gains included the appointment of the party leader, Datuk Haji Mohamed Asri bin Haji Muda, as Minister of Land Development in the federal Cabinet in late 1972, and an increased allocation of federal development funds to Kelantan. From the Alliance point of view there is a benefit in having a wide "National Front," similar to the inclusive "Golkar" in Indonesia. The exact shape of the front, however, is not yet clear, and it is unlikely to stay the same after the next parliamentary elections.

Opposition parties not in the National Front coali-

<sup>10</sup> James, Morgan, "Malaysia: New Faces Among the Old Guard," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 8, 1972, p. 11.

<sup>11</sup> *Asian Research Bulletin*, June, 1973, p. 1834.

<sup>12</sup> See *Hua Daily News*, quoted by M. G. G. Pillai, "Breaking Old Ties," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 18, 1972, p. 31.

<sup>13</sup> Syed Hussein Alatas, "The Politics of Coalition in Malaysia," *Current History*, December, 1972, pp. 271-273, 277.

<sup>14</sup> M. G. G. Pillai, "Consensus Time," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 15, 1973.

<sup>15</sup> In the case of the SUPP, the Sarawak Chinese Association (SCA).

tion have been considerably weakened. The least weak is probably the Democratic Action party, but it has suffered from expulsions and defections, and has lost some Chinese popular support following the revelation that it had had merger talks with the MCA. Its organizing secretary, Fan Yew Teng, having undergone trial for alleged sedition which had been declared a nullity by the Privy Council, had to face an inquiry on the same charge later in 1973.

## ECONOMIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

Governmental policy in the economic sphere has reflected increased concern for economic opportunities for Malays, notably in the sectors of business and of education, particularly at the tertiary level. The rationale behind this was the belief that Malays' discontent shown in May, 1969, derived largely from a feeling that their existing special rights in the constitution had done little to provide them with benefits from modernization and economic growth. This approach is followed in the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975, which established targets providing that within 20 years at least 30 per cent of all commercial and industrial activities will be managed and owned by Malays and other indigenous people.<sup>16</sup> Tun Razak, in an interview, saw this economic improvement of the Malays as occurring in the context of an expanding economy, not as taking away from what other communities had. At the same time, he could not put a limit on the period during which the Malays would need special preferences or privileges in order to improve their economic situation.<sup>17</sup> One short-term benefit for Malays said to have resulted from the UMNO General Assembly in 1973 was an increase in the prices paid to *padi* producers, who are mostly Malays.

Economic performance, as opposed to economic policy, showed an increase of 5.8 per cent in Gross National Product in 1972 over 1971. There had been a downward trend in the rubber market from 1970 onward, although prices recovered in the second half

of 1972. Palm oil production continued to increase, although exports of this product were also subject to falling prices. The Minister of Primary Industries, Datuk Abdul Taib bin Mahmud, predicted that timber might soon displace rubber as Malaysia's leading export earner. The export earnings from timber in 1972 were still below those from rubber, about M\$1.03 billion as compared with M\$1.6 billion, but the existence of large reserves plus improvements in forest management and timber marketing pointed to a reversal fairly soon.

## ASEAN: NEUTRALITY AND RELATIONS WITH CHINA

Malaysia's advocacy of neutrality for Southeast Asia and her willingness to enter into negotiations with China in advance of her partners in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore) may seem surprising.<sup>18</sup> It was partly the product of the British Labour government's decision to withdraw troops from the area, which was not entirely reversed by the new 1970 Conservative government in Britain, and partly by a more flexible attitude toward foreign policy which followed the Tengku's resignation as Prime Minister. The Five-Power Defense Arrangement (Malaysia, Singapore, Britain, Australia, New Zealand) formulated in April, 1971, was a temporary stop-gap, fortunately so in view of the election of a Labor Government in Australia (December, 1972), which withdrew some Australian troops from the area.

Additional reasons for Malaysia's rapprochement with China may have included her wish to export more rubber and other products to China, although she had already been exporting rubber there for some years. Malaysia may also have hoped that China would moderate her support for rebel movements in Sarawak and on the Malayan-Thai border, although it would have been unrealistic to expect explicit assurances on this point.<sup>19</sup> A more intangible benefit might lie in the effect which good relations with China could have on Malaysian Chinese. The rapprochement may undercut reliance on support from China by disaffected Chinese in Malaysia. In particular, Communist rebels in Malaysia cannot be entirely happy about these friendly contacts. Nor does

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<sup>16</sup> *Second Malaysia Plan*, p. 41.

<sup>17</sup> Interview with Tun Razak, *New Nation*, June 19, 1972, quoted in *Asia Research Bulletin*, Vol. 2, No. 2, July, 1972, p. 989. See two March, 1971, speeches in the Dewan Negara by Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie issued by the Government Printer in pamphlet form: *Democracy: Realities Malaysians Must Face; Pillars of the Nation*.

<sup>18</sup> R. S. Milne, "The Influence on Foreign Policy of Ethnic Minorities with External Ties," Mark W. Zacher and R. S. Milne, eds., *Conflict and Stability in Southeast Asia* (New York: Doubleday, 1974).

<sup>19</sup> The number of rebels on the Thai border is between 1,200 and 2,000. In Sarawak, the estimates range from 700 (official) to almost 2,000. On communism in Sarawak, see the Government White Paper, *The Threat of Armed Communism in Sarawak*, February 12, 1972.

In August, 1972, the Prime Minister stated in Parliament that there were 1,324 political detainees in Sarawak. There were further arrests of prominent business and professional men in Sibu, Sarawak, in September, 1973, on charges of collaborating with the Communists.

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*"Although it may be too early to advance solid conclusions, the point should be made that Indonesia again runs the risk of distorting the principle of nonalignment."*

## Indonesia's Orba and the Limits of Nonalignment

BY HENRI J. WARMENHOVEN

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TO THE DICTIONARY of Indonesian politics, traditionally rich in acronyms, the 1960's added two words with a faintly fascist ring. One is *Gestapu*, which for some time referred to the September 30 Movement.<sup>1</sup> On that day the momentous events started rolling that were to lead to *Orba* (short for *Orde Baru*), the New Order. The latter term, one will remember, used to be the portentous designation which the Nazis applied to the initial implementation of their millenarian aspirations. Although military regimes often evoke suspicions of fascism, these vague allusions—one phonetic and the other semantic—happen to be accidental, and the unfortunate choice of words should not lead to biased speculations concerning the nature of the new rule.

Indonesian politics has always been marked by a great deal of fluidity and continuity. There were landmarks, it is true, but these often were little more than inconspicuous links in a chain of events and capable of definition by hindsight only. Generally, changes are gradual and reflect transitions rather than disruptions. Even Sukarno's reign ended "not with a bang but with a whimper," an anticlimax that was achieved when he was finally transformed into a saddened spectator after a diminution of stature over a period of two and one-half years.<sup>2</sup>

The six months or so between Gestapu and the proclamation of Orba witnessed a great deal of uncertainty and ambiguity. To all intents and purposes, the army was in full control. However, numerous counterpressures and crosscurrents (some of which

operated below the surface of arrangement and compromise) impaired its direction. First, Sukarno and a number of his close associates had been left relics of authority. The army leadership had not felt secure enough to remove them from office, fearing that such a move would provoke renewed polarization, if not rebellion. But it was obvious that the very presence of the *ancien régime* eroded the army's prestige. It also compromised the opportunities for a new approach. Although much had happened—the coup, the countercoup, the PKI\* massacre—there was no evidence of a clear break with the past from a purely governmental point of view. Second, the army lacked administrative experience. Discounting brief periods of martial law, it had never been in a position of authoritative decision-making within the framework of public administration.

These strong forces could well have obliged the army leadership to refrain from any specific action had it not been for the deplorable economic situation. The inflation which had assumed grotesque proportions could be used to the government's disadvantage. The longer the army leadership waited, the more it would share the blame for the economy it had inherited. The proclamation of a New Order or some other similarly explicit action would allow the army to dissociate itself from the responsibility for the economic collapse. Also, a firm step, a new direction could gain international approval and goodwill which had been in regrettably short supply during the last years of Sukarno's administration.<sup>3</sup> Most probably, Suharto foresaw that he would have to depend on foreign aid, that there would be no other way to drag Indonesia out of the economic mire. The retention of power, however small and nominal, by Sukarno and his associates could promote speculation regarding a comeback. It was generally agreed that Sukarno's rule had been disastrous from an economic point of view. The mere possibility of a resumption of power on his

\* Indonesian Communist party.

<sup>1</sup> The Indonesian term *Gerakan September Tiga Pulu* is nowadays often abbreviated G/30/S.

<sup>2</sup> Suharto was appointed President by the People's Congress during its fifth session (March, 21–31, 1968).

<sup>3</sup> Indonesia's alienation from the international community was epitomized by her withdrawal from the United Nations. The go-to-hell incident is discussed by Howard P. Jones, *Indonesia: The Possible Dream* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), pp. 319–29.



part could only have an inhibiting effect on aid, loans and investments.

### THE PROCLAMATION OF THE NEW ORDER

The beginning of 1966, moreover, witnessed the emergence of a relatively new and potent force in Indonesian politics: student opinion. Large student groups gathered on the streets and clamored for the formal prosecution of Sukarno and those members of his Cabinet who were suspected of complicity in Gestapu. Subandrio, the Minister of Foreign Affairs who had been responsible for the close relationship with the People's Republic of China, and Chairul Saleh, a Sukarno favorite with leftist and luxurious inclinations,<sup>4</sup> headed the list of those whom the students wanted to stand trial. The student protests increased in volume. It is possible that they were army-inspired. They at least justified specific action on the part of the government at a time when it could no longer be delayed. But although the army leadership was thus forced to come to grips with the situation it proceeded with the utmost caution. Suspecting that Sukarno still enjoyed considerable support, the military decided to keep him politically alive (possibly as a symbol) for an additional period of time. Maybe they hoped that his stature, which rendered him sacrosanct, would diminish in the course of time. Although he was obliged to sign over most of his powers to Suharto, he was left the title of President and some of the symbols and insignia that pertained to the office.

His associates, however, were found to be expendable, and they were consequently removed from office and placed under arrest. These arrests were initially declared to be a form of "protective custody." Indictments were issued and formal prosecutions initiated only once it had become clear that the army's show of force (which came to be nicknamed "the Spring Cleaning") was not followed by any adverse reaction.<sup>5</sup>

The elimination of the old guard at last gave the army an opportunity to exercise full leadership. The New Order was announced. The situation was not without its ironies. First, Orba itself and the initial measures surrounding its implementation were promulgated in the name of Sukarno. Second, the man who had always emphasized the virtues of the permanent revolution and who had initiated the Conference of New Emerging Forces now came to be associated

with the Old Order. The Old Order acronymized into "ORLA" was not mentioned often in those early days but after 1968 it had become synonymous with a number of vices such as economic incompetence, corruption, luxurious living at the expense of the people and, above all, selling Indonesia out to the R.R.T. (the Indonesian initials for the People's Republic, which was suspected of having been implicated in the coup).<sup>6</sup>

The most important implication of the announcement of the New Order was that it legitimized the army leadership which thus far had operated on the basis of martial law, a state of siege and other emergency devices. However, a couple of qualifications need to be made in relation to the nature of the army rule. First, there was no question of a junta or a Council of Generals. The army made liberal use of top-level civilian administrators. Until the Spring Cleaning many of them were simply holdovers from the Sukarno era. It was only natural that the loyalties of some of them were suspected, and these were accordingly given little real power.

But a number of men before and particularly after the Spring Cleaning had never felt any sympathy for Sukarno's leftist tendencies. Although their attitudes had antagonized the Chief of State they had succeeded in retaining their freedom and in a number of cases their portfolios. Adam Malik, for instance, who originally had been a man of the left (of Murba orientation) had become disenchanted with communism during his ambassadorship in Moscow.<sup>7</sup> He was soon appointed successor to Subandrio, and in addition became one of the chief spokesmen of the new government. Sultan Hamengku Buwono, one of the few aristocrats to involve himself wholeheartedly in the Revolution, could also boast of a long record of service without ever having been affiliated with leftist parties or causes. He, too, was to become a prominent man in the new government.<sup>8</sup>

It would also be wrong to assume that the new men in power were unqualifiedly opposed to Sukarno. Some suspected that he had been implicated in the coup; others believed that the Communists had tried to use him for their purposes. It was remembered that during his decade-long balancing act, when the President had tried to placate the mutually hostile forces of the army and the Communists, he had often been receptive to recommendations made by the former or, alternatively, had ignored PKI requests. Some army men must have realized that Sukarno could have tipped the coup in favor of the Communists had he taken their side at the critical moment.<sup>9</sup>

The new government, and General Suharto in particular, opposed the idea of having the President tried on other grounds as well. Such a trial was bound to stir up feelings and sentiments which had just calmed down. Not only would the situation become unpredictable again but the road to progress would be

<sup>4</sup> Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 434.

<sup>5</sup> A total of 14 ministers and other leading authorities were arrested.

<sup>6</sup> See Guy J. Pauker, "The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Indonesia," in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), *The Communist Revolution in Asia*, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall: 1969), pp. 287-289.

<sup>7</sup> Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 431.

<sup>8</sup> Currently Vice President.

<sup>9</sup> Jones, *op. cit.* p. 388.

blocked by a prolonged trial that would distract the public mind. Lastly, Sukarno's trial would tarnish not only the man himself but also his reputation as the Great Leader of the Revolution, and as a consequence the revolutionary cause and the glory the Republic had reaped from it.

If these factors played a role in causing the Orba government to protect the President from being formally prosecuted, it was soon obvious that Sukarno realized the degree of leverage he had in this respect. He ceased to be manageable. Speeches come to mind such as the one held in the Bung Karno Sports Palace in late June, 1966, when Sukarno discarded prepared (and censored) notes, and argued that his position of President for life was inviolable except if a national election decided otherwise.<sup>10</sup> Or his last Independence Day address (August 17, 1966), when he on the one hand condemned the Communist role in the coup, and on the other extolled NASAKOM,\*\* one of his recent gimmicks that had already been banned as a clear violation of the Constitution. To cap it all, he defied the Orba strongmen by dismissing General Nasution as Minister of Defense.

About a year after some accommodation had been reached regarding the exercise of presidential powers, Sukarno's position was again reviewed in a Special Session of the MPRS<sup>11</sup> which decided:

*First*, that the President was declared unable to meet constitutional obligations;

*Second*, that the President was declared unable to execute the policy of the State and the Decrees of the MPRS;

*Third*, to prohibit President Sukarno from conducting political activities till the coming general elections, to revoke the MPRS mandate from President Sukarno and all the government powers as stipulated in the 1945 Constitution. . . .

The decree also allowed Sukarno to retain his title of President, and appointed Suharto "Acting President." Significantly, the latter office would be subordinate to and responsible to the MPRS.<sup>12</sup> If this rearrangement transformed the presidency into a sinecure, the Orba Chief Executive appeared anxious to spare Sukarno the embarrassment of being demoted. In an explanatory address, he indicated that Sukarno's

\*\* An acronym derived from "nationalism-religion-communism."

<sup>10</sup> See "Indonesia: The Unmaking of a President," *Time*, July 1, 1966.

<sup>11</sup> The Indonesian initials for the *Provisional People's Consultative Congress*.

<sup>12</sup> See O. G. Roeder, *The Smiling General* (Djakarta: 1969), p. 240.

<sup>13</sup> See *Asia* (journal published by the Asia Society, N.Y.), Autumn, 1970, which is entirely devoted to the theme, "Indonesia: Plans and Prospects."

<sup>14</sup> See Herbert Feith's many studies of Indonesia, and also Bernard K. Gordon, *The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 191-2.

<sup>15</sup> See Bernhard Dahm, *History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 135-8 and 157-8.

health had deteriorated so that it had become necessary to institute an additional office whose holder would in actual fact lead the government. The new Acting President realized that the incident was bound to distract the public mind, and that the revival of speculations could delay the execution of programs that waited. He, therefore, added the following admonition: "So let all of us no longer discuss the problem of the position of Bung Karno." It took one more year to deprive Sukarno of the title of President.

## ORBA'S NEW DESIGNS

Suharto's words reflected his belief that the Great Leader of the Revolution had finally concluded his career, and that as a result Indonesia had more definitely entered into a new era. Officially, Orba was one year old. The turmoil had subsided, and a climate of confidence seemed to be in the making. One of the Acting President's main concerns had been the economy, an area neglected by his predecessor. He had managed to persuade Indonesia's creditors to have the payments that related to the enormous debts which had accumulated over the years rescheduled.<sup>13</sup> In a number of areas, he had attempted to reverse decisions made by Sukarno, or to undo their results.

At this point, it may be useful to consider to what extent the house that Sukarno built could appear incompatible with Orba's policy designs. For although Suharto and his Cabinet had displayed exceptional patience and restraint vis-à-vis Sukarno as a symbol of Indonesia, it was obvious that his philosophy, or at least most of his philosophical notions, were highly antagonistic to their thinking. Orba as such had no clear ideology. The new men in power were neither ideologues nor—to use Herbert Feith's label—solidarity-makers.<sup>14</sup> It should be remembered that the army, unlike political parties, did not lend itself to the formulation of principles and broad policy concepts. It is true that the military always prided themselves on their role in the revolution, and they regarded themselves as instruments of the revolution rather than merely instruments of the state. Although this definition of their role could seem to border on the ideological conceptualization of their position in Indonesian society, it falls short of a program or platform of a political party as a traditional catalyst.

Part of the mutual hostility between the army and the Communists may be traced back to the so-called Madiun Affair.<sup>15</sup> At that time (1948), the fledgeling republic, while engaged in its struggle for independence, was confronted with an open rebellion that had been organized by the Communists. In the eyes of the military, this sudden threat to Indonesia's precarious existence had amounted to a "stab in the back." The rebellion was duly squashed, but a disproportionate degree of violence had surfaced in this first encounter

between the army and the Communists. The PKI staged a *joyeuse rentrée* at the 1955 elections, when it succeeded in securing an unexpectedly high proportion of votes.<sup>16</sup>

That was also the year of Bandung. Although the Afro-Asian Conference was attended by neutral and non-neutral nations (one will remember that Chinese Premier Chou En-lai made his debut in the forum of new nations), the historic occasion became a symbol of the third world and its philosophy of nonalignment. The cold war provided a natural setting for the new trend; indeed it has been argued that without the cold war nonalignment would never have made great strides.<sup>17</sup>

A number of reasons may explain the almost magic appeal which nonalignment had for new nations. Some of them felt that their hard-won independence should not be curtailed or compromised by alliances based on alien ideologies. Others wanted their non-alignment to constitute a "half-way house"<sup>18</sup> between communism and the West. Sukarno, too, refused to join either "the group that has faith in the Declaration of Independence of Thomas Jefferson . . . or the other group [that] believes in the Communist Manifesto of Karl Marx. . . ."<sup>19</sup> However, he wanted Indonesia to adopt an eclectic approach, and "pick out whatever is good from the ideas of Thomas Jefferson as well as from Karl Marx." Many Indonesian politicians, particularly those whose place on the political spectrum would be right of center, expressed their disappointment with the passive stance that the adoption of a nonalignment policy appeared to imply. Ali Sastroamidjojo, for instance, during his prime ministership pursued what he termed "an active and independent neutrality."

It is difficult to gauge the sincerity behind Sukarno's formal adherence to nonalignment. By 1964 or TAVIP, as that year had come to be called,<sup>20</sup> the principle had been seriously compromised. It could be argued that by that time Indonesia's nonalignment referred to the Sino-Soviet rift. And the last year before the coup witnessed a further alienation from the West, and correspondingly closer connections with

the People's Republic of China. These relations had not materialized as yet in an alliance. But a couple of treaties had been concluded, a few agreements made while Sino-Indonesian trade relations were steadily improving. In addition, a Djakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Peking axis was being discussed.<sup>21</sup> Then again, the withdrawal from the United Nations and the attempt to establish a counterorganization (the Conference of New Emerging Forces) constituted unprecedented violations of the spirit of nonalignment.

When Indonesia reemerged from Gestapu and its immediate aftermath she faced momentous problems in the field of international relations. The lack of experience the military may have had in this field was amply compensated by the skill and perception of a few civilians in the government among whom Adam Malik was the most prominent. The new men in power professed to be dedicated to an early restoration of Indonesia's nonalignment which they perceived as having been thoroughly compromised. At the time of the coup the *Ganjang* (crush) *Malaysia*<sup>22</sup> campaign appeared to have reached its climax, and one of the first concerns of the ORBA men in the field of foreign affairs was a deescalation of the conflict. This was followed by a domestic deemphasis on the *Konfrontasi*. Meanwhile, steps were taken to have Indonesia readmitted to the United Nations: On September 28, 1966, within a year after the coup, Indonesia resumed her seat in the United Nations, and about a year later, she opened diplomatic relations with Malaysia. Thus Sukarno (still President be it only nominally) was forced to witness the undoing of two of his major stratagems.

In 1967, Indonesia sponsored a new regional organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. ASEAN, which in actual fact succeeded an earlier and less successful attempt, represented a welcome approach to regional cooperation in the fields of education, cultural affairs and trade. Misgivings have been expressed with regard to the possibility that the cooperation might grow into a military alliance (and thus again violate nonalignment principles) but all rumors concerning military cooperation among the various nations in question have by and large remained unconfirmed.

A border case between domestic and foreign concerns was the so-called Act of Free Choice that was granted to the people of Irian (currently Irian Jaya) in 1969. The Netherlands-Indonesian Agreement of August 15, 1962, provided for the exercise of the right

(Continued on page 275)

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Henri J. Warmenhoven lived for some time in Indonesia, working as an administrator in the Irian Jaya Territory prior to its transfer to Indonesia. He specializes in Southeast Asian and Comparative Politics.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 171 (Table XI-General Elections, 1955).

<sup>17</sup> This point is made by a Colombo newspaper as cited by Werner Levi, *The Challenge of World Politics in South and Southeast Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 114.

<sup>18</sup> See Lewis P. Fickett, Jr., *Problems of the Developing Nations* (New York: T. Y. Crowell, 1966), p. 7.

<sup>19</sup> Paul E. Sigmund (ed.), *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations* 2d revised ed. (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 106-11.

<sup>20</sup> TAVIP was an acronym which in full would read *Tahun Vivere Periculoso* ("Year of Dangerous Living"); see Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 441.

<sup>21</sup> See O. G. Roeder, *The Smiling General* (Djakarta: 1969), p. 173.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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### ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

**TWENTIETH-CENTURY INDONESIA.** By WILFRED T. NEILL. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973. 413 pages, selected references, illustrations and index, \$15.00.)

The Indonesian republic is large in size, heavily populated and rich in natural resources. The diverse people of the Indonesian archipelago are still seeking cohesiveness. Wilfred Neill has written with interesting detail about the country, its flora, fauna, people and history. The author explores the political history of Indonesia with much less detail than he provides with regard to her biological development. Nevertheless, the general information in this volume makes it a useful reference source.

O.E.S.

### RACE AND POLITICS IN URBAN MALAYA.

By ALVIN RABUSHKA. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1973. 148 pages, notes, bibliography, references and index, \$6.50.)

Drawing on a Gallup-type public opinion poll, Alvin Rabushka explores the racial problem in Malaysia, concluding that "Racial harmony is . . . more likely to be furthered by reducing the role of government in Malayan society and by greater reliance on an expanding private sector." Some knowledge of statistics will be helpful to the reader of this brief study.

O.E.S.

### CAMBODIA IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN WAR.

By MALCOLM CALDWELL AND LEK TAN. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973. 445 pages, appendix and maps, \$15.00.)

This detailed account of Cambodia's role in the Southeast Asian war is dedicated to (among others) "all the Indochinese people and to the revolutionary masses of the world in the hope that it will contribute . . . to the ultimate defeat of American imperialism. . . ." Malcolm Caldwell is Lecturer in the Economic History of Southeast Asia at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Lek Tan is a Cambodian free lance journalist. With a frank bias, their study traces the development of what the authors perceive as American imperialism in Southeast Asia and, specifically, the role of Cambodia. Documentary appendices and maps are helpful, but the lack of an index is to be regretted.

O.E.S.

### MISCELLANY

**MILITARY RULE IN AFRICA.** By ANTON BEBLER. (New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1973. 278 pages, \$17.50.)

This is a study of the domestic and external political, social and economic factors leading to military coups in Africa, with special attention to four case studies from West Africa. A largely negative profile emerges of the motivations of military hierarchies intervening in the political arena and their performance once in office.

Samuel Decalo

New School for Social Research

**MAO TSE-TUNG AND I WERE BEGGARS.** By SIAO-YU. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1973. 346 pages and index, \$1.95.)

Dr. Siao-yu, director of the Sino-International Library in Uruguay and a former official of the Kuomintang government, describes a hiking trip he took with Mao Tse-tung in the summer of 1917, a "beggar's holiday." Well written, the account offers some insight into the early life of Chairman Mao.

**QUOTATIONS FROM PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI.** (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1973. 103 pages, \$4.95.)

A compilation of the views of Premier Chou En-lai, in his own words.

**THE LIBYAN REVOLUTION.** By MEREDITH O. ANSELL AND IBRAHIM MASSAUD AL-ARIF. (Stoughton, Wis.: Oleander Press, 1972. 301 pages and index, \$22.50.)

This is a valuable reference book of source material in English translation dealing with the Libyan revolution in 1969. It contains official documents, laws and press interviews during the one-year period after September, 1969.

**THE FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM OF ISRAEL: SETTING, IMAGES, PROCESS.** By MICHAEL BRECHER. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972. 693 pages, appendices, selected bibliography, glossary and index, \$17.50.)

Michael Brecher, who has written perceptively of India, extends his interest to Israel. He has contributed a major work of scholarship to our knowledge of the political culture, decision-making elite, and the outlook of Israel. The most original material treats the composition and operation of



the Israeli foreign ministry. The author's somewhat emotional criticisms of Israeli policy toward nonalignment and the Arabs raise anew the question of whether we can actually learn to anticipate foreign policy behavior on the basis of a clinically detailed knowledge of the elite who make foreign policy.

A.Z.R.

**ISRAEL AND THE ARABS: PRELUDE TO THE JEWISH STATE.** BY ANNE AND I. ROBERT SINAI. (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1972. 248 pages and index, \$9.95.)

This is an account of the events leading to the establishment of the state of Israel. The authors give the background of the U.N. decision to partition Palestine in 1948 to make room for an Arab state that was to exist alongside the state of Israel.

**THE ALMANAC OF WORLD MILITARY POWER.** BY T. N. DUPUY AND WENDELL BLANCHARD. (New York: Bowker, 1972. 373 pages, glossary and index, \$22.50.)

The authors have written a comprehensive survey of world military power. In addition, they have analyzed the economic, social, political and psychological factors that contribute to the effective use of military power. It is particularly interesting to note their assessments of the countries involved in the struggle between Israel and the Arab states in the Middle East. Excellent maps contribute much to the value of this work.

**FRANCE SINCE 1789. REVISED EDITION.** BY PAUL GAGNON. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972. 577 pages, selected bibliography, map, appendix and index, \$4.95, paper.)

This is a revised edition of the work which first appeared in 1964. The revised work continues the history of France through the presidency of Charles de Gaulle. The author has written a "convenient chronology of events, ideas and men around which to gather" other readings in original sources and literature. He believes that a study of the French people over the last two centuries will help the reader understand the French nation. Gagnon particularly admires the code of honour of Charles de Gaulle which allowed him to face new realities unflinchingly and to act for France with imagination and honour.

O.E.S.

(Continued on page 276)

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*Erratum:* The editors regret that an error appeared in Kuan-I Chen's article, "The Outlook for China's Economy," in our September, 1972, issue, on page 104, left column, line 3. The reference is to "Japan's peak [steel] production of around 13 million tons during World War II," not to "China's peak production."

*Erratum:* We regret that an error appeared in the article, "Soviet-American Relations in Transition," by Alvin Rubinstein, in our October, 1973, issue. Footnote 4 on page 154 should have read *The Times* (London), July 10, 1973. Because of an editing error, the quotation was erroneously ascribed to *The New York Times*.

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DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR., Publisher

## VIETNAM: POLITICS

*(Continued from page 251)*

text contained nothing to support the claim of Saigon sovereignty over the PRG zone, and United States national security adviser Henry Kissinger (now Secretary of State), in his lengthy explanation of the meaning of the agreement, carefully avoided mention of the issue.

Thieu's hostility toward the fundamental purpose of the Paris Agreement has also been expressed in his refusal to provide the personnel of the PRG on the Joint Military Commission with the "privileges and immunities equivalent to those accorded diplomatic missions and diplomatic agents," as called for by Article 16(c) of the cease-fire protocol. The RVN made it clear that it would not treat Communist delegates as political and diplomatic equals, keeping them as virtual prisoners in their compounds, organizing mobs to assault them physically and even bombing, shelling or occupying some of the sites from which PRG delegates were to be picked up from the PRG zones. As a result of these policies, the PRG stopped its deployment of Joint Military Commission personnel in February, thus bringing the keystone of the truce enforcement machinery to a halt.<sup>35</sup> This fundamental obstacle to any enforcement of the cease-fire was never removed.

### CONCLUSION

The most serious weakness of the Paris Agreement has been the opposition of the RVN to its central provisions, which were generally seen as benefiting the PRG. The implementation of the agreement by the Saigon side has been virtually nonexistent, although it has probably been restrained in the size and scope of its offensive operations by the need to avoid the appearance of too-blatant military violations. From the point of view of the DRV and the PRG, the benefits of the agreement have been to free the PRG heartland from bombing, which has permitted the first steps toward economic and military viability. But these benefits have to be weighed against continued RVN pressures against the PRG zone, including some successful "nibbling" of PRG territory. Thieu's defiance of key political provisions has thus far prevented the emergence of any strong political opposition movement in the cities, while the process of accommodation at the hamlet level has been limited by Thieu's military and police measures. Perhaps even more important, the reverse migration of refugees which the PRG clearly hoped would take place has not yet achieved the proportions necessary to correct the ar-

tificially created demographic imbalance between the PRG zone and the Saigon government zone.

As Hanoi's leaders have demonstrated in the past, they do not hastily abandon a line of policy once it is accepted. Their decision to abandon the military offensive was based on the assumption that Communist support for the agreement and Thieu's defiance of it would confer an important political advantage on the PRG and would give the Communists an opportunity for reconstruction of the PRG zone. Thieu's violation of the Paris Agreement's central provisions, therefore, will not by itself cause a shift away from support for the agreement. But if and when the liabilities of strict respect for the agreement appear to Hanoi and the PRG to outweigh the advantages, an attempt to complete the 1972 offensive may be forthcoming.

## MALAYSIA TODAY

*(Continued from page 265)*

the MCA now have to be on the defensive against charges that the Alliance government, of which it is a part, is anti-Chinese-culture because it refuses to have dealings with the government of China. By April 18, 1973, the Prime Minister could say in Parliament that diplomatic relations with China were only a question of timing.<sup>20</sup>

The neutrality issue is more difficult, because it concerns a large number of countries with differing policies. The ASEAN countries vary in their views; Singapore, for example, sees a balance of superpowers in the area as the best guarantee of neutrality, but is not opposed to their presence, while Indonesia would rather reduce the influence of the superpowers there. Much depends, too, on the willingness of the superpowers, the United States and the U.S.S.R.,<sup>21</sup> China (and in a different way Japan), to respect such neutrality.

### RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA AND SINGAPORE

Within ASEAN there have been increasing links with Indonesia: there has been an agreement on economic and technical cooperation, on border operations against Communist rebels, on control of the passage of shipping through the Malacca Straits, and on a common spelling system for the two national languages, a project which began over a decade ago but was interrupted by Sukarno's policy of Confrontation. Malaysian-Singapore relations are still affected

*(Continued on page 275)*

<sup>20</sup> *Straits Times*, April 19, 1973.

<sup>35</sup> For a discussion of the non-functioning of the Joint Military Commission, see Porter, "The Implementation of the Paris Agreement," pp. 447-49.

<sup>21</sup> For example, in spite of a friendly visit to the U.S.S.R. by Tun Razak in September and October, 1972, the revived Soviet proposals for a collective security agreement in the area do not coincide with Malaysian ideas on neutrality. On these proposals see Leo Gruliov, "Brezhnev's Asian Plan: Outflank Mao," *Christian Science Monitor*, August 18, 1973.

## THE VIETNAM WAR

(Continued from page 246)

"unprovoked," and the war resolution drafted over two months previously went through both Houses with only two senators, Oregon's Wayne Morse and Alaska's Alfred Gruening, voting nay. The resolution empowered the President "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack . . . and to prevent further aggression." Furthermore, to defend "world peace," the United States would be prepared, "as the President determines, to take all necessary steps . . . to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty . . . in defense of its freedom."<sup>12</sup>

Among the insiders, opinions differed on the next step. Some—Rostow and others in the State Department and all the military—proposed a round-the-clock bombing of North Vietnam and began secret preparations accordingly. "Operation Rolling Thunder," it was to be called. To paraphrase Rostow: "If this mightiest nation resolved to use its vast power, the other side would buckle." The sentiment was common to the whole administration. But the President had to be cautious. He was nearing the last leg of his campaign for reelection, and to counter the rash demands of his rival, Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater, he offered himself as "the candidate of reason and restraint." Through a Canadian emissary an ultimatum was sent to Hanoi. But Pham Van Dong, the Premier, "showed himself utterly un-intimidated and calmly resolved to pursue the course . . . to what he confidently expected would be its successful conclusion."

With support from China, North Vietnam everywhere held the advantage: in Laos, where the Communist Pathet Lao party controlled the strategic Plaines des Jarres; in Cambodia, where the ruler, Prince Sihanouk, was openly seeking an alliance with China; most of all in South Vietnam, where the Vietcong had penetrated as far south as Bin Dinh and were in a position to cut the country in two. Ironically, the Americans agreed that they were "playing a losing game." The Vietcong were "better armed and led today than ever in the past" (August 10). "War weariness and hopelessness" pervaded South Vietnam, "particularly in the urban areas." Factionalism was "a national attribute"; the Saigon regime was crumbling; and Washington feared that it would sell out to the Vietcong and "invite" the Americans to leave. To President Johnson, a stable government in South Vietnam was a political necessity, and the way to get it was to bomb North Vietnam if the Saigon

generals would first promise to cease their intrigue. Toward the end of December, General Taylor scolded them, but failed to exact a promise.<sup>13</sup>

Despite misgivings even in the Defense Department and well-founded arguments against it, Operation Rolling Thunder started on March 2, 1965. A week later the President approved the use of a new terror weapon, napalm, destined along with chemical defoliants to devastate the countryside in a futile effort to annihilate the Vietcong. When these methods were unsuccessful—guerrillas blew up the American embassy in Saigon, and the Vietcong strengthened their hold around the city—it was decided, April 1, 1965, to introduce ground troops and start an offensive against North Vietnam. The President issued strict orders against premature publicity, however, and on two separate occasions he stated publicly that he knew of no change of strategy or policy. Thus began the credibility gap.

Meanwhile, the Saigon generals staged another coup: Khanh was allowed to go into exile, and the ambitious young marshals, Nguyen Van Thieu and Cao Ky, took over. American ground-troop action began with 3,500 marines, accompanied by a continual expansion of the air war. General William C. Westmoreland (placed in command and given practically a free hand) successfully demanded increases to 175,000 (June, 1965), 275,000 (July), 443,000 (December), 542,588 (June, 1966). Each time, he had to confess the Vietcong were too much for him, though both he and the joint chiefs promised victory "by the end of 1967." Such reassurances probably explain the President's studied attempts to evade embarrassing questions.<sup>14</sup>

Objections to this madness came from several quarters: from George W. Ball, whose lone voice in the State Department (July, 1965) protested that making war in a country where the local population was hostile would mean defeat and humiliation in the end; from the United Nations Secretariat which, supported by Britain, France and other countries, proposed submission to the Security Council; finally, from Robert McNamara, head of the Defense Department, whose dissent broke the solidarity of the ruling circle. McNamara's was a tardy admission that the United States could not win. "The Establishment is out of its mind," one of his assistants had admonished him, but it took another season of ferocious bombing attacks to bring the secretary around. A concerted effort through the summer of 1966 to destroy the oil tanks in Hanoi and Haiphong resulted in heavy losses for the Americans, but left the enemy unmoved.

In May, 1967, McNamara proposed to the President a negotiated peace, but the military still kept the President's ear. To their demands for more troops, Johnson showed resistance, however. Presumably he was more sensitive than they to the anti-war

<sup>12</sup> Printed in full in *The Pentagon Papers*, pp. 264-65.

<sup>13</sup> The quoted passages are from *The Pentagon Papers*, pp. 256, 269, 291-92, 326, 339, 370-73.

<sup>14</sup> See Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 315-57.



riots and other signs of trouble within the United States. "Where does it all end?" he asked the joint chiefs. In January, 1968, the enemy answered this query in its own way by a sudden, surprise offensive consisting of scattered but well-coordinated attacks throughout South Vietnam. Westmoreland put in another troop requisition calculated to raise the total to 731,756, and proposed invading Cambodia, Laos and North Vietnam. This time, the military was rebuffed. The President himself was obviously war weary and fearful of domestic outbreaks, and in March, 1968, he took the first step toward sanity: a reduction in the bombing. North Vietnam responded with an offer to negotiate.

### TROOP WITHDRAWAL

Responsive to popular clamor, United States President Richard Nixon soon began the withdrawal of ground troops. Alleging his purpose to be the "Vietnamization" of the war, he held out to an incredulous public the dubious prospect that South Vietnam could be trained and equipped to take care of herself. From a total of about 600,000 in 1968, American troops dwindled in number to 23,700 in January, 1973. These moves proved highly popular, as did Hanoi's release of its American prisoners, many of them pilots shot down during the innumerable sorties conducted by the United States Air Force in its vain endeavor to break the enemy's resistance.

By giving the returned prisoners an elaborate, carefully rehearsed heroes' welcome, the administration was able to gloss over the decisive defeat of the United States in 20 years of probably the costliest and certainly the most futile of the many wars in American history. Occasionally during the five-year interval, the war flared up—an invasion of Cambodia in the spring of 1970, the laying of mines in the coastal waters of the Gulf of Tonkin, another savage attack from the air on North Vietnam. Fresh anti-war demonstrations, outbursts of student indignation, diminishing respect for authority were manifest consequences of these forays. Publication of *The Pentagon Papers*, on which I have drawn heavily for this essay, was a landmark in revealing the extent to which successive administrations from Eisenhower-Dulles to Johnson-Rusk-McNamara had meddled in Southeast Asia for the benefit of what was absurdly called "national security."

President Nixon in January, 1973, announced "peace with honor." But the credibility gap continued to widen. Renewed attacks on the Vietcong turned out to be raids on what were said to be "rebel" forces in Cambodia, a distinction without a difference, but one which involved the American military in outright prevarication. In August, 1973, caretaker governments still survived in Saigon and Pnom Penh, but otherwise Southeast Asia was com-

munist-dominated. This is what European realism had anticipated in 1954 and what American folly, at incalculable cost, only deferred.

## THAILAND

(Continued from page 261)

American forces in Thailand, the new United States Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, made it clear that the United States would retain its military options, its strong base in Thailand, and its continuing policy of treating Southeast Asian affairs as primarily problems in military gamesmanship. He identified Hanoi as "the fountainhead of insurrection" in Southeast Asia—a role the United States government had for 25 years assigned to China. He stated that the United States would support Saigon militarily in the event of happenings which the Pentagon would identify as "North Vietnamese aggression." He announced that while the United States would negotiate some withdrawal of forces in Thailand, it "would leave sufficient air support in Southeast Asia," and these forces "could be reinforced."<sup>27</sup> The statement left little doubt that those who looked to United States military withdrawal from Southeast Asia would have to await the end of the Nixon administration. American disengagement in Southeast Asia was still posture, not reality.

Thanat's widely read protestations are clearly at odds with the Nixon-Schlesinger plans for the continued American military dominance in Thailand. As the Thai debated among themselves, they remained enmeshed in American military schemes. Regardless of the withdrawal of surplus garrison troops from the seven Thai military bases run by the United States,\* the prediction of Thanat that Thailand must extricate herself from her status as a base of American military operations in Southeast Asia reflects a fracture within the Thai political elite.

### THE EVENTS OF OCTOBER, 1973

The convulsive reactions which surged through the body politic of Thailand in October, 1973, will affect Thai foreign policy postures, but the degree should not be exaggerated. The student *rebellion* manifested during September and October does not foretell any *revolution*. At first blush, these developments resulted from gross and indelicate handling by the military of university students and their unprecedented strong organizations.<sup>28</sup> However, at this writing, as the streets of Bangkok are still being cleaned up by stu-

\* E.g., 3,500 Marine guards were withdrawn from Thailand in late August, 1973, and fighter-bomber units were reduced in number.

<sup>27</sup> *The New York Times*, August 18, 1973.

<sup>28</sup> Early reporting of these events was understandably vague but available in *ibid.*, the *Chicago Tribune*, and in distributed U.P.I. evaluations.



dent volunteers and the thousand dead and wounded are being care for, there seems no justification to assume that the installation as Prime Minister of the respected *apolitical* rector of Thammasat University, Sanya Thammasak, marks the overthrow of the military clique. The military has composed the most coherent and stubborn agglomeration of political power within the Thai society since at least the Revolution of 1932. In the Sanya Cabinet the new Minister of Defense, Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chulasapya, is a holdover from the Thanom Cabinet and a confidant and protégé of Thanom. Another Thanom man, Army Lieutenant General Sawaeng Senanarong, continues in his Cabinet post as adviser to the Prime Minister. The direct instigators of the violence against the students, Thanom, Praphas, and Colonel Narong Kit-takachorn, son of Thanom and son-in-law of Praphas, have left the country; but their close associates and political dependents remain in the fountainhead of authority.

The university student unions and the central association of student unions now possess higher status. But civilian leadership also enjoyed short periods of glory during the 1930's and immediately following World War II.

Nevertheless, the Achilles heel of the Thai military—its dependence upon foreign sources of supply and of finance—provides grounds for civilian optimism. The military for a generation has lived in a heady and luxurious fashion, spending freely the currency of “anti-communism” and pro-Americanism. Thailand has maintained a military establishment at a level well above both the necessities of Thai foreign relations and the economic capacity of the country to support such a military facade.

Rural and non-industrial nations cannot join in superpower battles without becoming victims of superpower ambitions. The choice is neutrality and regional cooperation or destruction. The lesson from the Indochinese tragedies is surely in the thoughts of both militarist and non-militarist in Thailand.

The security of Thailand may best be served by the removal, if possible, of the American military presence. Thai hopes for leadership roles within Southeast Asian regional deliberations and activities will be smothered by continuing military-economic dependence upon the United States. American withdrawal of the massive American military establishment would serve the more fundamental and lasting goals of both the United States and Thailand. Surely China desires some rapprochement with the United States in the three-cornered jousting among the superpowers—and China is a superpower. China's main enemy remains the U.S.S.R. Marxists need the example of a traditionalist military regime as a propaganda whipping boy. Hanoi needs both American material aid and a decent proximity of American power as a balance for the

ominous presence of China. One can suggest that Chinese-assisted social rebellion may be cooled down at the Thai border, especially if Thailand is able to shed her political burden of being an American military base and a sanctuary for American military attacks on Thailand's neighbors.

Traditional loyalty to the political status quo and the respected monarchy among the main body of the Thai people—including the university students, by no means incidentally—make Thailand distinct in political expectations from the countries of Indochina. Yet the highly visible and dominating American military presence will inevitably hasten the erosion of the institutional structure which it is ostensibly designed to protect. When the artificial market economies in the garrison cities of Thailand—distorted by the inpouring of American dollars for war and military construction—dry up, so may any vestige of “capitalism.” Disrupted and confused agricultural economies do not turn to *laissez faire* principles. They are more easily driven into totalitarian economic and political practices.

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## MALAYSIA TODAY

(Continued from page 272)

by the circumstances in which Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965. The former Malaysia Singapore Airlines split into two in 1972 was accompanied by a dispute about the name to be given the new Singapore Airline. And on May 8, 1973, Malaysia announced rather suddenly the termination of the free interchangeability of the Malaysian and Singapore dollar. “Clouding the relation always has been emotion, and it is becoming clear day-by-day that unless this is reduced or removed altogether, the stresses and strains that have characterised ties between the two countries can be expected to continue.”<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup> M. G. G. Pillai, “Singapore-Malaysia, Emotion Clouds the Issues,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 13, 1973.

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## INDONESIA

(Continued from page 269)

of self-determination by 1969.<sup>23</sup> Although the agreement (which was subsequently endorsed by a unanimous General Assembly resolution) had been duly signed by Indonesia, Sukarno had soon started to equivocate with regard to its implementation. In his view, the Act of Free Choice (as the exercise of the right of self-determination had been labeled) was “not really necessary.” Meanwhile, the territory's administration had been transferred to Indonesia. The future of Irian became very uncertain after Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations. Many people

<sup>23</sup> Dahm, *op. cit.*, pp. 207–11.

argued that the Act of Free Choice which was to take place under the auspices of the United Nations had now become legally, or at least technically, impossible. However, shortly after Indonesia's return to the U.N., various Orba authorities indicated that they would abide by the pledge. And, indeed, 1969 witnessed the implementation of the stipulation in question,<sup>24</sup> and although the outcome was hardly surprising, it could be said that the Orba government had, at least officially, honored a pledge given by Sukarno and Subandrio.

The next year was marked by two initiatives.<sup>25</sup> First, Suharto paid a state visit to the United States, where he expounded Indonesia's conception of the Nixon Doctrine at the National Press Club. Second, Indonesia sponsored a Foreign Ministers' Conference on Cambodia. Invitations had been extended to some 20 countries (only half that number attended). The conference had been intended to neutralize Cambodia. It had very little effect, but it showed that Indonesia was still concerned with nonalignment issues.

At the same time one may note that Indonesia's position on these questions was not so neutral as she wanted it to appear. This became particularly evident in the vote on Peking's admission to the United Nations. It will be remembered that to the chagrin of the American State Department many developing nations which in the past had received large sums of money from the United States failed to follow the American position with regard to the issue. Significantly, Indonesia voted for the defeated United States resolution which required a two-thirds majority for the expulsion of Taiwan from the world organization, and then abstained on the successful Albanian resolution which intended to expel Taiwan and seat the People's Republic. It is possible that the Indonesian position on the China question did not represent public opinion in Indonesia, and *Pedomani*, an Indonesian newspaper, argued that "the policies of those in power had raised questions in the minds of the people."<sup>26</sup> One may in addition point out that the diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the People's Republic have remained in a state of suspended animation (they were never officially severed).

The Fourth Summit Conference of Nonaligned Countries which was held in Algiers earlier this year offers evidence that the issue of nonalignment is by no means dead. Shortly before the Indonesian national delegation left for Algeria, its head, foreign

Minister Adam Malik, stressed the ways nonalignment could be utilized in the current climate of rapprochement in order to help the developing nations to accelerate their process of nation-building and economic development.<sup>27</sup> The economic emphasis which pervaded his speech on this occasion undoubtedly stemmed from his Orba orientation.

Although it may be too early to advance solid conclusions, the point should be made that Indonesia again runs the risk of distorting the principle of nonalignment.

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## CAMBODIA

(Continued from page 256)

itary clout to the Phnom Pehn regime than it has. The fate of a sovereign state lies in the balance. An American policy and American bombing have placed a small country's physical and political survival in escrow for many years to come, not for the benefit of the people who live there nor in defense of any laudable ideal.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 271)

THE DEVIL AND JOHN FOSTER DULLES. By TOWNSEND HOOPES. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973. 505 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$15.00.)

This is a detailed and absorbing account of the life of John Foster Dulles, President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Secretary of State and the architect of American foreign policy in the 1950's: the era of cold war confrontation between the superpowers, with its "agonizing reappraisals," brinkmanship, and talk of "liberation" and "massive retaliation."

Key premises of the Dullesian foreign policy were the inherent evil of communism and its inherent inferiority; for Dulles, Bolshevism was the product of the devil. By the time Dulles resigned because of illness, shortly before his death, he had "led in the building of a powerful anti-Communist rationale which gave justification to dramatic and far-flung American military deployments." When he died, "more than a million American officials, military and otherwise, including their dependents and servitors, were stationed in about forty-two countries. . . . This vast formation represented unprecedented imperial power."

Only in the 1970's, under another Republican administration, has the devil theory of communism been modified. This skillful biography will help shed light on the era of cold war diplomacy.

O.E.S.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 257-9.

<sup>25</sup> One may find both issues detailed in *Focus on Indonesia*, published by the Information Division, Embassy of Indonesia, Vol. 3, No. 7 (September, 1970).

<sup>26</sup> As cited by the *Washington Post*, December 31, 1971.

<sup>27</sup> See *Indonesian News & Views*, No. 8/73 (August, 1973), p. 5. For a report on the conference see *Time*, September 17, 1973, pp. 35-39.

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# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

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*A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of October, 1973, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### European Economic Community

(See *Finland; U.S.; Foreign Policy*)

### International Monetary Crisis

Oct. 1—For the 1st time in 6 weeks, the price of gold falls below \$100 an ounce.

### Middle East War

(See also *Intl, U.N.; Austria; Israel; U.S.S.R.; U.S., Foreign Policy, Government, Military*)

Oct. 6—The heaviest Arab-Israeli fighting in the Middle East since the 1967 war breaks out on 2 fronts on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur. U.N. military observers report that Egyptian forces have crossed the Suez and that Syria has attacked the Golan Heights.

Oct. 7—Israeli forces counterattack in the Sinai and on the Golan Heights.

President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia promises to dispatch troops to aid Egypt and Syria.

Oct. 8—President Gaafar Nimeiry of the Sudan announces that Sudanese forces are en route to join Arab forces.

The government of Iraq announces that it is providing armed forces for the Egyptian-Syrian command.

The U.S. representative to the U.N., John A. Scali, urges the Security Council to seek an end to hostilities in the Middle East and to restore the 1967 cease-fire line.

Oct. 9—6 Israeli Phantom jets attack Damascus, causing about 100 civilian casualties and heavily damaging the Soviet cultural center.

Oct. 10—The Israeli chief of staff's special adviser, Major General Aaron Yariv, reports in a televised news conference that Israel has abandoned most of her Bar-Lev line along the east bank of the Suez Canal, and has repulsed Syrian forces from the Golan Heights.

Western correspondents touring the east bank of the Suez Canal report that Egyptian soldiers and equipment continue to cross the canal. Egyptian forces have advanced about 10 miles on the east bank.

An Israeli source reports that the Syrian army has been forced back to the 1967 cease-fire line in Syria.

King Hussein of Jordan issues a decree calling up all reserve army officers; he orders the army

mobilized.

*The New York Times* reports that U.S. officials believe that the Soviet Union is airlifting military supplies to Egypt and Syria.

The Iraqi military command announces air and ground participation in the war against Israel.

Oct. 12—Israeli forces advance to within 18 miles of the Syrian capital of Damascus.

The Syrian command announces the downing of 35 Israeli planes and reports that Israeli missile boats have sunk 3 freighters—Soviet, Japanese and Greek—at the ports of Latakia and Tartus.

Yakov A. Malik, the Soviet delegate to the U.N., accuses Israel of "barbarous" attacks on nonmilitary targets.

Oct. 13—The Jordanian command sends a military contingent to Syria and declares that King Hussein will cooperate with the leaders of Egypt and Syria in the war against Israel.

Heavy fighting continues in Syria; Israel claims to have destroyed most of an Iraqi division.

Oct. 14—Egypt reports she has launched a heavy offensive along the Sinai front and claims to have destroyed 150 Israeli tanks and at least 24 planes. Israel reports destroying 220 Egyptian tanks.

In 8 days of warfare, the Israeli command announces that 656 Israelis have died.

Oct. 15—U.S. State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey announces that the U.S. has begun to resupply Israel with military equipment to prevent an upset in the military balance in the Middle East caused by the Soviet Union's "massive airlift."

Following charges yesterday that the U.S. is supplying Israel, the Soviet Union pledges to assist the Arab effort to recapture territory lost in the 1967 war.

Oct. 16—Egyptian President Anwar Sadat calls for a cease-fire and Israeli withdrawal from territories seized in 1967.

An Israeli military spokesman announces that a "fairly large" task force has crossed over to the west bank of the Suez Canal to attack Egyptian missile sites, tanks and artillery.

Oct. 17—The Arab oil-producing states, meeting in Kuwait, announce a 5 per cent monthly reduction in the flow of oil to the U.S. and other countries supporting Israel.

President Sadat, in a public speech, issues an "open letter to President Nixon," in which he offers

an immediate cease-fire if Israel will withdraw to her pre-1967 boundaries.

In Washington, D.C., 4 Arab foreign ministers, representing 18 Arab countries, meet with U.S. President Richard Nixon and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to present a peace proposal.

Oct. 18—The Middle East News Agency announces that Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin has met 3 times in Cairo with Sadat for 2 days of private talks, to discuss a diplomatic settlement of the Middle East war. Kosygin leaves for Moscow.

*The New York Times* reports that fierce fighting has occurred between Egyptian troops and the Israeli units on the west bank of the Suez Canal.

In a radio broadcast, Saudi Arabia announces that she is cutting back oil production by 10 per cent and that she will cut off all oil to the U.S. if American support for Israel is continued. The U.S. gets a total of 6 per cent of its necessary oil imports from all the Arab oil-producing countries.

The Libyan government orders a total halt to all shipments of crude oil and petroleum products to the U.S.

Oct. 19—In Beirut, Lebanon, guerrillas seize the Bank of America and take hostages. They demand \$10 million for the Arab war effort, the release of Palestinian rebels held by Lebanon, and safe conduct to Algeria.

An Israeli military spokesman announces that Israeli forces have penetrated 15 miles into Egypt and have destroyed artillery and missile batteries; they also have expanded their bridgehead on the west bank of the Suez Canal.

Police and army commandos fight their way into the Bank of America in Beirut to rescue 39 hostages. One American is killed. The 5 guerrillas are either killed or captured.

Oct. 20—An Israeli military spokesman reports that the Israeli bridgehead on the west bank of the Suez Canal has been enlarged. The Israeli task force operating in Egyptian territory reportedly numbers 10,000 men and 200 tanks.

The Saudi Arabian government announces that it will halt all oil imports to the U.S.

At the request of the Soviet Union, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger arrives in Moscow and begins talks with Soviet Communist party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev on ending the Middle East crisis.

Oct. 21—4 Persian Gulf states—Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Dubai—announce a total cut-off of oil exports to the U.S. Theoretically, the flow of all Arab oil to the U.S. is now suspended.

At a meeting of the Security Council, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. present a joint resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire in place in the Middle East and for implementation of the 1967 Security

Council Resolution 242 demanding Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied since the 1967 war. The U.S.-Soviet resolution was worked out at the Brezhnev-Kissinger meeting in Moscow.

Oct. 22—Kissinger visits Israel on his way home from Moscow; he confers with Premier Golda Meir and other Israeli leaders.

Following Egyptian and Israeli consent, a cease-fire becomes effective on the Egyptian front. Israeli and Syrian forces continue to fight.

In separate statements, Iraq and the Palestinian Liberation Organization reject the cease-fire called for by the Security Council.

The Jordanian government announces acceptance of the cease-fire; however, it claims that the Jordanian army contingent fighting in Syria is under the command of Syria.

Oct. 23—The Security Council adopts a resolution reaffirming the cease-fire and asking Israel and Egypt to return to positions held when the cease-fire became effective at 12:52 P.M. (New York time) on October 22. The resolution asks that U.N. observers be stationed along the Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire line. U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim announces that Syria will abide by the cease-fire, contingent upon Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967.

Oct. 24—Egyptian and Israeli forces continue to fight despite the cease-fire.

The Israeli command reports that part of the 20,000-man Egyptian force on the east bank of the Suez Canal, encircled by the Israeli army, has tried unsuccessfully to break out of its encirclement despite the cease-fire.

At an emergency session of the U.N. Security Council considering Egypt's proposal that U.S. and Soviet troops police the cease-fire, the Soviet delegate to the U.N., Yakov A. Malik, declares that the Security Council should punish Israel; he appeals to U.N. members to cut diplomatic ties with Israel.

In the U.S., the White House announces that it will not send troops to the Middle East; it hopes that no other foreign powers will.

Oct. 25—The Egyptian government accuses Israel of continuing to violate the cease-fire. An Egyptian official declares that today the Israelis have cut the vital supply road from Cairo to the city of Suez.

The Egyptian III Corps, estimated to contain 15,000 to 30,000 soldiers, remains trapped on the east bank of the Suez Canal, unable to replenish supplies of food and water, or to retreat because of the Israeli task force on the west bank. An Israeli spokesman declares that Israel has cut the Egyptian water pipelines to the east bank.

Fearing Soviet intervention in the Middle East, the U.S. government orders a worldwide "precautionary alert" for its military forces. According to



U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, the U.S. has received "ambiguous" indications from the Soviet Union that it might go to the aid of Egyptian troops trapped by the Israelis.

Oct. 26—*The New York Times* publishes a report filed from Israeli-occupied Sinai in which Israeli officers and men are said to be in agreement that trapped Egyptian troops, cut off from water, food and oil supply lines, will receive fresh supplies only if they surrender.

Oct. 27—The U.S. State Department announced that Egypt and Israel have agreed to negotiate directly on implementing the cease-fire.

Oct. 28—Israel permits a truck convoy carrying food, water, and medical supplies to pass through her lines on the west bank to aid the trapped Egyptian III Corps. According to official sources in Tel Aviv, Israel approved the agreement after the U.S. informed Israel that the Soviet Union had threatened to rescue the trapped men.

Oct. 29—Premier Meir visits Israeli troops on the west bank of the Suez Canal.

Ismail Fahmy, acting Egyptian Foreign Minister, arrives in Washington, D.C., reportedly with a message from President Sadat. At Fahmy's request, he confers with U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger.

Oct. 31—Israeli Premier Golda Meir arrives in the U.S. for talks with President Nixon on Israel's concern over U.S. pressure on her to make concessions to Egypt.

President Sadat warns that Egypt will begin to fight again unless Israeli forces withdraw to the cease-fire lines of October 22.

## North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Oct. 30—In Vienna, members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO formally open their conference on troop and arms reductions in Central Europe.

## United Nations

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

Oct. 2—Secretary General Kurt Waldheim rejects the Austrian proposal that the U.N. take over the Schönau transit camp for Soviet Jews because the General Assembly has not authorized such action.

Oct. 5—Following a challenge yesterday by black African nations led by Senegal and Tanzania, the General Assembly votes to reject the credentials of the South African delegation but allows its members to speak and participate in the U.N.

Oct. 7—After 2 days of closed meetings, the Security Council fails to call for a cease-fire in the Middle East.

Oct. 9—Yakov A. Malik of the Soviet Union walks out of the Security Council during the expression of condolences by Yosef Tekoah of Israel for the "innocent civilian victims" of Israeli bombing of

Damascus; Soviet citizens were among the victims.

Oct. 10—The U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization in Rome proposes an international grain stockpiling program to meet possible food emergencies.

Oct. 15—The General Assembly elects Cameroon, Mauritania, Iraq, Byelorussia and Costa Rica to 2-year terms on the Security Council.

Oct. 25—In an attempt to avert a Soviet-American confrontation in the Middle East, the U.N. Security Council votes to set up a U.N. emergency force to supervise the Middle East cease-fire; troops from smaller nations will be employed. The resolution excludes the 5 permanent Security Council members from participating in the emergency force.

Oct. 26—Secretary General Waldheim, at an emergency meeting of the Security Council, declares that an advance unit of 900 troops will be in Cairo tomorrow in an effort to install as fast as possible a U.N. force of 7,000 men to police the Middle East cease-fire.

Oct. 27—Voting 14 to 0, the Security Council approves arrangements to send a 7,000-man U.N. peace-keeping force to the Middle East for 6 months; the U.N. members will share the \$30-million expense.

## War in Indochina

Oct. 8—The U.S. Defense Department reports that it lacks military aid funds to meet the Cambodian armed forces' ammunition needs.

Oct. 10—Premier Thanom Kittikachorn of Thailand says that the U.S. is temporarily suspending the withdrawal of American forces from Thailand.

Oct. 11—A Laotian government spokesman announces that tomorrow the Communists will begin moving into the 2 non-Communist capitals of Laos, the administrative capital of Vientiane and the royal capital of Luang Prabang, under the terms of the Laotian peace agreement. The 2 capitals are to be neutralized.

Oct. 23—South Vietnamese planes and artillery attack North Vietnamese and Vietcong positions near a division base camp at Lai Khe.

Oct. 24—U.S. intelligence officials report that North Vietnam has moved 70,000 men into South Vietnam since the cease-fire of January 28, 1973.

Oct. 26—The South Vietnamese government announces fighting has erupted in the Central Highlands in the general area of the Plei Blang base, captured by the North Vietnamese 3 days ago.

Oct. 28—In Cambodia, enemy forces close one supply line, Route 5, while government forces reopen Route 4.

## Warsaw Pact

(See *Intl, NATO*)

## ARGENTINA

Oct. 9—Julian Julio, secretary of a drivers' local

union, is the 4th labor leader to be assassinated since Juan D. Perón's return to power.

Oct. 12—Perón is installed as President of Argentina, and his wife is installed as Vice President.

### AUSTRALIA

(See also *Japan*)

Oct. 10—Responding to political criticism, Prime Minister Gough Whitlam relinquishes his secondary post as minister for foreign affairs; he delegates the post to Senator Donald R. Willesee of West Australia, a special minister of state.

Oct. 11—Overseas Trade Minister Jim Cairns announces a more than \$600-million wheat deal with China.

### AUSTRIA

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Oct. 2—Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and Israeli Premier Golda Meir confer in Vienna for nearly 2 hours but reach no agreement on reopening transit facilities for Soviet Jews.

At a news conference later, Kreisky says that only individual Soviet Jews may pass through Austria "by the shortest route and with the shortest possible stop."

### CAMBODIA

(See also *Intl, War in Indochina*)

Oct. 15—Information Minister Sum Chhum announces that President Lon Nol has refused to accept the resignation of Premier In Tam, announced 5 days ago.

### CANADA

Oct. 5—The government announces a more than \$1-billion sale of up to 224 million bushels of wheat to China.

Oct. 13—Concluding a 6-day visit to China, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau signs a trade agreement with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and confers with Chinese Chairman Mao Tse-tung in Peking.

### CHILE

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Oct. 4—The military junta announces that it will guarantee the protection of foreign political exiles. Catholic and Protestant church leaders set up a Human Rights Commission to defend the rights of Chileans as well as foreigners.

Oct. 6—Military authorities announce the execution of 18 "extremists," as raids and arrests continue.

Oct. 8—U.N. delegate and Foreign Minister Vice Admiral Ismael Huerta Díaz agrees to permit Amnesty International to investigate charges of the abuse of human rights in Chile.

Oct. 14—The military junta bans the 7 political parties that supported the government of the late President Salvador Allende Gossens.

Oct. 19—General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, head of the ruling military junta, announces that the government will return to former owners most of the over 300 Chilean and foreign companies nationalized without compensation by the government of the late President Salvador Allende Gossens.

### CHINA

(See *Australia, Canada*)

### EGYPT

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

Oct. 1—Egypt hires the U.S. firm of Bechtel, Inc., to build a \$400-million oil pipeline from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, bypassing the Suez Canal which has been closed since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

### FINLAND

Oct. 5—Finland signs a free-trade agreement with the European Economic Community, completing the linking of the Common Market and the European Free Trade Association, of which Finland is a member. It must be ratified by the Parliament.

### GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

Oct. 3—The East German Parliament unanimously elects Horst Sindermann, now First Deputy Premier, to the premiership; the present Premier, Willi Stoph, is named to the largely ceremonial post of Chairman of the Council of State, or President.

### GREECE

Oct. 1—President George Papadopoulos receives the resignations of his Cabinet ministers, including 7 former junta colonels from the 1967 army coup; he chooses Spyros Markezinis, politician and historian, as "Premier-designate . . . accountable and responsible only to the President."

Oct. 8—Pledging "impeccable" elections as soon as possible for all but Communist and royalist candidates, Markezinis is sworn in as Premier of Greece's 1st all-civilian Cabinet since the 1967 coup.

### ICELAND

(See also *United Kingdom, Great Britain*)

Oct. 16—British and Icelandic leaders agree on a settlement of their dispute over fishing rights: Britain will respect a 50-mile zone claimed by Iceland.

### IRAQ

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

Oct. 7—Iraq announces the nationalization of the oil

interests of 2 U.S. companies—the Mobile Oil Corporation and the Exxon Corporation.

### **ISRAEL**

(See also *Intl, Middle East, U.N.; Austria*)

Oct. 3—The Cabinet calls on Austria to reopen transit facilities for Soviet Jews.

### **JAPAN**

Oct. 3—Premier Kakuei Tanaka concludes a 4-day visit to Britain to discuss economic cooperation.

Oct. 4—2 large Japanese steel corporations agree to build and deliver a \$380-million steel plant to China by 1975.

Oct. 8—After visiting France, Britain and West Germany, Premier Tanaka meets with Soviet leaders; he is the 1st Japanese head of government to visit the Soviet Union since 1956.

Oct. 10—At a news conference before leaving Moscow, Premier Tanaka expresses disappointment at Soviet refusal to return 4 former Japanese islands as part of a final peace agreement.

Oct. 30—Premier Kakuei Tanaka and Prime Minister Gough Whitlam of Australia agree to negotiate a new treaty “to formalize, stabilize and broaden” their relations.

### **JORDAN**

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

### **LAOS**

(See *Intl, War in Indochina*)

### **LEBANON**

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

### **NETHERLANDS, THE**

Oct. 30—The Dutch government, facing an Arab ban on oil exports to The Netherlands, appeals to other members of the E.E.C. to share their oil. The Arabs have accused the Dutch of supporting Israel.

### **NORWAY**

Oct. 12—Trygve Bratteli, Labor party leader, agrees to form a government; Premier Lars Korvald and his non-Socialist coalition have resigned.

Oct. 16—Bratteli and his Cabinet are sworn in.

### **PAKISTAN**

Oct. 10—The 2d phase of the repatriation of Pakistani war prisoners begins with the return of 840 out of some 12,000 persons expected home this month.

### **PORTUGAL**

Oct. 25—65 opposition candidates, principally leftist-oriented, withdraw as candidates in the election for a National Assembly scheduled for October 28;

they will lose their political rights for 5 years under a decree issued by the government.

Oct. 28—In elections today, all 150 seats in the National Assembly are filled by the officially sponsored Popular National Action party.

### **SUDAN**

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

### **SYRIA**

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

### **THAILAND**

(See also *Intl, War in Indochina*)

Oct. 14—After a series of violent clashes between government troops and students, King Phumiphol Aduldet announces the appointment of Sanya Thammasat, dean of Thammasak University, to replace Premier Thanom Kittikachorn, whose military-dominated government has been the target of student protests.

Oct. 16—Premier Sanya names a new, largely civilian Cabinet to act as a caretaker administration until a constitution is drafted and elections held.

### **TUNISIA**

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

### **TURKEY**

Oct. 16—Almost complete returns disclose that the Republican People's party (with a left of center orientation) has won its first national election in 23 years; it captured 178 of the 450 seats in the National Assembly. The Justice party, which ruled until martial law was declared 2 years ago, has won 145 seats.

### **UGANDA**

Oct. 2—President Idi Amin and the President of the Vietcong Provisional Revolutionary Government, Nguyen Huu Tho, agree to establish diplomatic relations.

### **U.S.S.R.**

(See also *Intl, Middle East, U.N.; Japan; U.S., Foreign Policy, Government, Labor*)

Oct. 1—In a joint communiqué in Belgrade, Premier Aleksei M. Kosygin and Yugoslavia's Premier Djemal Bijedic pledge noninterference in each other's internal affairs, industrial cooperation and strengthened understanding.

The Soviet Union opens a natural-gas transmission line to West Germany.

Oct. 12—The party journal *Kommunist* attacks Andrei D. Sakharov, the dissident physicist, for “anti-Sovietism.”

Oct. 26—Communist party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev, in a speech before the World Peace Congress meeting in Moscow, accuses the U.S. of aggravating ten-

sions with "fantastic rumors" of Soviet unilateral military intervention in the Middle East. Brezhnev declares that the Soviet Union has sent "representatives" to the Middle East to observe the cease-fire; sources report that these "representatives" number less than 100 civilians.

Oct. 27—*Tass* (official Soviet press agency) issues a Soviet statement criticizing the U.S. government and indirectly President Nixon. Describing the U.S. action as "an attempt to intimidate the Soviet Union," the statement declares that the reasons given by the U.S. for the "precautionary alert" of its forces were "absurd."

## UNITED KINGDOM

(See also *Iceland*)

### Great Britain

Oct. 2—Yielding to an ultimatum from Iceland, the government agrees to withdraw its naval frigates from disputed fishing waters and avert a break in diplomatic relations.

Oct. 8—Prime Minister Edward Heath announces new anti-inflation measures at a televised news conference.

### Northern Ireland

Oct. 5—Representatives of Northern Ireland's 3 main political parties meet for 5 hours. A joint statement discloses "some measure of agreement" on the need for establishment of a coalition government. Today's talks focused on economic and social matters.

Oct. 28—A British soldier in Northern Ireland is killed by members of the military Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army.

## UNITED STATES

### Civil Rights

Oct. 3—The Air Force complies with yesterday's Federal Civil Service Commission ruling to reinstate A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a cost analyst fired after his exposure of cargo-plane cost overruns in 1970.

Oct. 15—The government drops a major case against 15 Weathermen rather than disclose how it obtained its evidence. In Detroit, federal District Judge Damon J. Keith ordered the disclosure in June.

### Economy

Oct. 4—The Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that because of a big decline in food costs, September registered the largest decline in food prices for a single month since February, 1948; but the 1.5 per cent drop was relatively small compared with a 6.2 per cent increase in August. Prices of industrial products rose sharply in September.

Oct. 12—The Census Bureau reports that new home construction fell about 25 per cent in August, sug-

gesting a serious mortgage-money squeeze.

Oct. 15—President Nixon signs legislation requiring federal agencies to limit interest rates on time deposits of less than \$100,000.

The Cost of Living Council says that as of Nov. 1, retailers may raise their pump prices whenever the wholesale cost of gasoline goes up.

Oct. 18—Several large banks reduce their prime rate from 10 per cent to 9¾ per cent.

Oct. 26—The Department of Commerce reports that in September, the U.S. trade surplus totalled \$873.3 million, the largest surplus for a single month since March, 1965.

## Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl. Middle East, U.N., War in Indochina; U.S.S.R.; U.S., Government*)

Oct. 1—President Richard Nixon and François-Xavier Ortoli, chief executive of the European Common Market, hold talks described as "very positive."

The Senate adopts a resolution of concern over the closing of Austria's transit facilities for Soviet Jews.

Oct. 3—At a news conference, President Nixon announces that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger will visit China Oct. 26–29; he states that he has appealed to Chancellor Bruno Kreisky of Austria to review the closing of transit facilities for Soviet Jews.

In Moscow for the 3d plenary session of the Soviet-American Trade Commission, Secretary of the Treasury George P. Shultz concludes 3 days of meetings with Soviet leaders on Soviet-American trade.

Oct. 6—Secretary of the Treasury Shultz and Secretary of Commerce Frederick B. Dent arrive in Belgrade for talks with Yugoslav leaders.

Oct. 19—President Nixon asks Congress for \$2.2 billion for emergency military aid for Israel.

## Government

(See also *Intl. Middle East*)

Oct. 1—President Richard Nixon signs legislation placing the major federal volunteer service programs under one agency, Action.

Dispelling rumors of long prison terms, Chief Judge John J. Sirica, in the U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., tells the original defendants in the Watergate case—E. Howard Hunt, Jr., Bernard L. Barker, Eugenio R. Martinez, Frank A. Sturgis and Virgilio R. Gonzalez—that he will not give them maximum sentences.

Donald H. Segretti, campaign assistant to White House aides, pleads guilty to charges of 3 misdemeanors for playing "dirty tricks" in the 1972 Florida Democratic primary.

Oct. 2—The Senate votes approval, 54 to 42, of a \$1.2-billion foreign aid bill.



Completing legislation differing in minor details from a similar Senate bill, the House of Representatives votes 313 to 90 to authorize \$50.2 million to continue operations by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

The administration orders federal supply-management of heating oil, the 1st such peacetime control, and a supply-allocation program.

Oct. 3—U.S. District Judge Walter E. Hoffman authorizes Vice President Spiro Agnew's attorneys to conduct their own inquiry into the alleged Justice Department leaks of information of the investigation by the U.S. attorney's office in Maryland. The court order grants full power of subpoena that will permit Agnew's lawyers to question under oath anyone considered "appropriate and necessary."

Referring to the charges against Vice President Agnew as "serious and not frivolous," President Nixon tells newsmen that it is "altogether proper" for the Vice President not to resign if indicted.

Testifying before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Segretti says he reported regularly to President Nixon's former appointments secretary, Dwight L. Chapin, on the "dirty tricks" he was playing on candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination.

Oct. 4—Samuel Dash, chief counsel for the Senate Watergate committee, asks Chief Judge John J. Sirica in U.S. District Court to order the President to surrender the secret presidential tapes relevant to the Watergate case.

The Senate passes, 79 to 9, a bill appropriating \$33.4 billion for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, \$579 million higher than the HEW appropriation already passed by the House of Representatives.

In a statement President Nixon urges Congress to give the Soviet Union most-favored-nation trade status.

Oct. 5—In an unprecedented search for news leaks from the Justice Department, lawyers for the Vice President serve at least 7 subpoenas on news organizations and reporters.

Oct. 8—In a hasty "sense of the Senate" resolution, the Senate calls for a cease-fire in the Middle East and asks Israel and the Arab states to return to the positions they held before this week's hostilities.

Oct. 9—The Senate votes approval, 82 to 8, of a major environmental-energy bill establishing federal standards over strip mining of coal.

President Nixon urges householders to lower their thermostats by 4 degrees this winter as one of the measures of a "citizen action guide to energy conservation."

Oct. 10—Spiro T. Agnew resigns as Vice President. Immediately following the delivery of his formal statement to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger,

Agnew pleads nolo contendere, or no contest, before U.S. District Judge Walter E. Hoffman to the government charge of failing to report \$29,500 in income in 1967. Agnew tells a Baltimore courtroom: "I admit that I did receive payments during the year 1967 which were not expended for political purposes and that, therefore, these payments were income taxable to me in that year and that I so knew."

Judge Hoffman sentences Agnew to 3 years probation and fines him \$10,000; because of Attorney General Elliot L. Richardson's plea for leniency, Judge Hoffman declares that Agnew will not receive a prison sentence.

Agnew declares himself innocent of any other wrongdoing and cites a letter from President Nixon respecting his decision. He says he resigned for the sake of the "national interest." In accord with the agreement between the Justice Department and Agnew's lawyers, Attorney General Richardson submits to the federal district court as part of the permanent record of the case a 40-page document containing evidence gathered against Agnew by U.S. attorneys in Baltimore.

U.S. District Judge Jack Roberts orders the Nixon administration fully to allocate impounded funds for water pollution control grants to Texas.

Oct. 11—Leaders of the House of Representatives agree to the request by Secretary of State Kissinger to postpone next week's scheduled vote on the administration's trade bill because of the discussions with the Soviet Union on ending the Middle East crisis.

A federal grand jury indicts Egil Krogh, Jr., former presidential aide, on 2 counts of false declaration in the matter of the break-in of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's former psychiatrist.

Frank Mankiewicz, campaign director for Senator George McGovern, a 1972 Democratic presidential candidate, tells the Senate Watergate committee that the sabotage activities of the President's reelection committee succeeded in causing discord among the candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination.

Oct. 12—President Nixon nominates Representative Gerald Rudolph Ford (R., Mich.), the minority leader of the House of Representatives, to be the 40th U.S. Vice President.

In a short acceptance speech, Ford pledges to "do my utmost to the best of my ability to serve this country well and to perform those duties . . . with as much accomplishment as possible."

Referring to its historic decision as "unavoidable" and "extraordinary," the U.S. Court of Appeals, in a 5 to 2 vote, rules that President Nixon must turn over to the federal district court the White House tape recordings relating to possible Watergate

crimes; the district court is to decide what material to turn over to the Watergate grand jury.

The House of Representatives votes, 238 to 123, to limit the President's authority to commit U.S. armed forces without congressional approval and sends the bill, approved earlier by the Senate, to President Nixon.

Citing improper donations, the Federal Elections Office reports that Senator Hubert H. Humphrey's 1972 campaign organization failed to disclose contributions of \$456,732 until more than a year after the presidential nominations.

Oct. 13—President Nixon submits to Congress the nomination of Gerald R. Ford for Vice President.

The Senate passes and sends to the President an appropriations bill of \$19 billion for the Department of Housing and Urban Development and other agencies.

Oct. 15—In a televised address to the nation, former Vice President Spiro T. Agnew stresses "denial of wrongdoing" and says he resigned to help restore trust in the vice-presidency.

Oct. 17—In U.S. District Court, Chief Judge John J. Sirica rules that the district court does not have jurisdiction to handle the Senate Watergate committee's request that President Nixon turn over his presidential tapes.

American Airlines, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., and Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. plead guilty in 3 federal district courts to having contributed illegally to President Nixon's 1972 election campaign. Under a policy announced by the Watergate special prosecutor, Archibald Cox, the corporation and its responsible officer are charged; the board chairmen of Goodyear and 3M plead guilty also.

Oct. 19—President Nixon announces that he will not obey the order of the U.S. Court of Appeals to release the presidential tapes. Last week the Court of Appeals upheld Judge Sirica's ruling that he hear the presidential tapes in camera; the deadline for filing an appeal expires tonight. Rejecting an appeal to the Supreme Court, President Nixon orders the Justice Department's Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox to drop the investigation. Refusing to surrender the tapes to Judge Sirica, President Nixon also announces that, to avoid a constitutional crisis, he will prepare a written summary of the tapes relevant to the Watergate case. Senator John C. Stennis (D., Miss.) will be permitted to listen to the tapes to authenticate the accuracy of the President's summary, which will then be sent to the Watergate grand jury and the Senate Watergate committee. The leaders of the Senate Watergate committee agree to the President's plan, but the other 5 Senators on the committee must also approve.

Watergate Special Prosecutor Cox states that he will not obey the President's directive to end his efforts to obtain a court order for the presidential tapes. Declaring that President Nixon is in contempt of the federal courts for refusing to make available subpoenaed material for the Watergate grand jury, Cox asserts that he will not break his "solemn pledge to the Senate and the country to invoke judicial process to challenge exaggerated claims of executive privilege."

John W. Dean 3d, former presidential counsel, pleads guilty to trying to cover up the Watergate break-in.

Oct. 20—In a specially called televised press conference, Cox explains why he has refused to obey the President's directive.

Attorney General Elliot L. Richardson resigns rather than obey President Nixon's order to fire Watergate Special Prosecutor Cox. Deputy Attorney General William D. Ruckelshaus is dismissed by the President when he also refuses to discharge Cox. President Nixon informs the Solicitor General, Robert H. Bork, that he is now acting Attorney General. Bork dismisses Cox and has F.B.I. agents seal off Cox's office. President Nixon announces that he has abolished the Watergate special prosecutor's office. The offices of Richardson and Ruckelshaus are also sealed off.

Oct. 23—President Nixon agrees to surrender the presidential tapes to Judge Sirica. The decision is announced by the President's lawyers before Judge Sirica in federal district Court in Washington, D.C.; they declare that the President's "response along different lines" has been superseded.

The House Judiciary Committee opens hearings on the possible impeachment of President Nixon.

President Nixon vetoes a \$216.7-million authorization bill for the U.S. Information Agency because it required the agency to turn over any confidential material demanded by Congress; he asserts that the provision compelling the release of such information would violate the constitutional separation of powers and executive privilege.

Chief of the White House staff Alexander Haig, Jr., announces that the arrangement to turn over a summary of the presidential tapes to the Senate Watergate committee has been abandoned.

The Senate Watergate committee asks the U.S. Court of Appeals to try to expedite its suit to obtain the tapes.

Oct. 24—Representative Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (D., N.J.), says that the House Judiciary Committee will continue to proceed with the impeachment investigation.

President Nixon vetoes a bill that would make the President's power to commit U.S. forces to fight overseas for more than 60 days subject to congress-

sional approval.

The House sends to the White House a bill providing for a 25 per cent increase in federal aid for school lunch programs.

Oct. 26—President Nixon, in a nationwide news conference (finally held after 2 postponements), defends his Middle East policy and the need for yesterday's "precautionary alert" of U.S. forces. He declares that his handling of the Middle East crisis, the worst faced by the U.S. since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, "not only avoided a confrontation but . . . moved a great step forward toward real peace in the Middle East." In regard to Watergate, President Nixon announces that acting Attorney General Bork will name a new Watergate special prosecutor next week. Reaffirming "the principle of confidentiality," he says that he will not give presidential documents to the special prosecutor.

It is reported that Democratic leaders in the Senate and House demand that the special prosecutor be made completely independent of the White House.

The U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., in a suit brought by the Association of American Medical Colleges, orders the Nixon administration to release over \$140 million in impounded funds for medical research and training.

Oct. 29—Archibald Cox testifies before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the need for the "total independence" of any new special prosecutor.

Oct. 30—The Senate votes and fails to muster the necessary two-thirds approval to override the President's veto of an authorization bill for the U.S.I.A.

Oct. 31—At a special hearing, J. Fred Buzhardt, Jr., presidential counsel, tells Judge Sirica that President Nixon will not be able to deliver 2 important Watergate tapes. In one instance, Buzhardt says that the telephone had not been hooked into the recording system; in the other, a tape recorder functioned improperly.

Observing that he has not been formally nominated, Senator William B. Saxbe (R., Ohio) tells newsmen that President Nixon has offered him the post of U.S. Attorney General and he has accepted.

The House completes action on a revised bill providing a 3-year, \$185-million authorization for federal aid for emergency medical services. President Nixon vetoed a similar bill earlier this year.

The Civil Aeronautics Board approves cuts in scheduled flights by major airlines because of the fuel shortage.

## Labor and Industry

Oct. 2—The National Association of Manufacturers, the United States Chamber of Commerce and 23 major companies join with Soviet organizations to

form a new Soviet-American Trade Council to promote trade expansion.

Oct. 22—At the AFL-CIO convention in Florida, the nearly 900 delegates approve a statement by their Executive Council advocating the resignation of President Nixon or his impeachment.

## Military

Oct. 29—The U.S. Defense Department announces that a naval task force, including an aircraft carrier, 5 destroyers and a tanker, has been ordered to the Indian Ocean.

Oct. 31—The Defense Department ends the military alert ordered last week, except for men and officers of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

## Politics

Oct. 16—In Atlanta, Georgia, Maynard Jackson, a black lawyer, is elected mayor. He is the first black mayor of a major Southern city.

## Supreme Court

Oct. 9—The Supreme Court dismisses without comment the Nixon administration's plea for an expedited ruling on the constitutionality of the President's impoundment of funds appropriated by Congress.

Oct. 15—The Supreme Court upholds a lower court ruling allowing the Federal Communications Commission to require broadcasters to censor themselves.

With the 4 Nixon appointees dissenting, the Court repeats its view that an Ohio law prohibiting abusive speech is unconstitutional because it could be used against speech protected by the First Amendment.

Oct. 23—The Supreme Court sends 8 obscenity convictions back to the lower courts for review in the light of the obscenity guidelines outlined last June; in that major Court decision, local community standards were declared the criteria for what is or is not obscene.

## URUGUAY

Oct. 29—A government decree orders the closing of the nation's only university.

## VENEZUELA

Oct. 26—Venezuela announces an average price increase for petroleum of 56 per cent.

## VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

(See *Intl. War in Indochina*)

## VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See *Intl. War in Indochina*)

## YUGOSLAVIA

(See *U.S.S.R.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

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